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Globalization and the Convergence of
Values
Alex Y. Seita*
As the twentieth century comes to a close, the circumstances of individual
nations-their affairs, news, and problems-have tended increasingly to
reach and captivate global audiences. A predominant reason has been the
economic importance of foreign countries. Greater numbers of domestic
businesses, employees, and consumers have looked to foreign markets,
investors, and products for economic prosperity as well as economic compe-
tition. While driven primarily by economic factors, the process of globaliza-
tion-in which international issues become as important as national, state,
and local matters-has significant political and other noneconomic content.
Democracy and human rights are, for example, as much a part of globaliza-
tion as are free market principles. While globalization has detrimental
effects, they can be minimized through the cooperative efforts of the United
States and the other industrialized democracies which share basic economic
and political values. America and its democratic allies should strongly pro-
mote and carefully manage globalization, for it has significant beneficial
implications for humanity. Globalization is causing, and being reinforced
by, a worldwide convergence of economic and political values that portend a
possible, though distant, future world in which human beings will look
upon themselves as part of a single humane civilization comprised of a sin-
gle human race.
Introduction
Globalization is one of the great forces shaping the world today. It is a
multifaceted concept encompassing a wide range of seemingly disparate
processes, activities, and conditions-some nebulous, others concrete-that
often reinforce as well as clash with each other. They are connected
together by one common theme: what is geographically meaningful now
transcends national boundaries and is expanding to cover the entire planet.
Globalization has led to an awareness that international issues, not just
domestic ones, matter.
Globalization means many things. It is foremost an economic pro-
cess.1 Economic globalization refers to the world-wide integration of mar-
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1. See infra notes 38-58 and accompanying text.
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kets.2 In economic globalization, markets for goods, services, financial
capital, and intellectual prqerty take on transnational or global propor-
tions. A paramount consequence of market integration has been increased
economic interdependence among nations.
Globalization is also a political event, as evidenced by the spread of
democracy and human rights among nations.3 Although it may be less
extensive and have a less immediate impact than economic globalization,
political globalization nevertheless has a significant international presence.
There are now a greater number of democratically governed countries pro-
tective of fundamental human rights-rights that all human beings are enti-
tled to, such as the rights to life and liberty, freedoms of expression and
religion, freedom from torture or discrimination, and the right to a fair
trial.4 A majority of the world's population may now live under democrati-
cally elected governments affording a measure of basic human rights.5
In addition to its all-important economic and political roles, globaliza-
tion has numerous other dimensions. They reflect the wide range of
human activity and thought, from the technological, cultural, legal, philo-
sophical, and environmental, to the criminal and detrimental. The various
aspects of globalization often interact with each other. For example, tech-
nology not only facilitates economic and political globalization, but
together with economic globalization helps to introduce different cultures
into local consciousnesses. 6
Law has been important in managing economic globalization and may
become as important with respect to political globalization. 7 The ideology
of globalization can be broadly divided into substantive and procedural
components. The most important procedural element is the rule of law-
the idea that disputes will be settled and agreements negotiated through
the observance of established principles rather than the use of force or the
intimidation of power.8 In turn, the substantive principles, what the rule
of law seeks to enforce, are those that nations have selected to settle dis-
putes and negotiate agreements. The rule of law can be a way of resolving
conflicts effectively, peacefully, and cooperatively.
Furthermore, globalization enhances the perceived importance of dis-
tant international problems relative to local problems. Thus, protection of
the environment beyond national borders has attracted strong interna-
tional support, and the conflict between environment protection and eco-
nomic development created the global issue of sustainable development. 9
2. See, e.g., C. Fred Bergsten, Globalizing Free Trade, FOREIGN Arr., May-June 1996,
at 105; Zia Qureshi, Globalization: New Opportunities, Tough Challenges, FIN. & DEy.,
Mar. 1996, at 30; MicAwL E. PoRTER, THE ComErrnvE ADvANrAGE OF NATIONS 14-15
(1990).
3. See infra notes 59-82 and accompanying text.
4. Cf. infra notes 37 (listing human rights), 63 (defining democracy).
5. See infra note 67.
6. See infra notes 77-98 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 144-60 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
9. Cf. infra note 186.
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On the downside, technology together with economic and political global-
ization can facilitate the movement of criminal and terrorist activities
across national boundaries and help criminals and terrorists to operate
like efficient international businesses. 10
Most significantly for this Article, however, globalization is an impor-
tant source of common economic and political values for humanity.
Globalization is simultaneously a cause and a consequence of the conver-
gence of basic economic and political systems among nations. As the activ-
ities of globalization help to converge economic and political systems, their
existence reciprocally facilitates the expansion of globalization. Momen-
tously, the convergence of these systems is leading to the convergence of
fundamental values-deeply held beliefs about what is right and wrong."3
There is a widespread, though not universal, acceptance among
nations of the basic values of liberal democracy: a market economy (or
free markets), a democratic government, and the protection of human
rights. Although particular details may differ from country to country, the
general nature of these values is the same. The convergence of basic eco-
nomic and political values among nations is a pivotal event because it is a
necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the eventual emergence of a
consensus among human beings that there is but one human race.12
This Article argues that the United States and the other industrialized
democracies (e.g., the members of the European Union, Japan, and Can-
ada), collectively referred to as the "West,"13 should vigorously support
and substantially guide the process of globalization. As it is currently
emerging, globalization fosters desirable common national values by
advancing general forms of market economies, democracy, and human
rights.14 It is precisely those general characteristics of liberal democracy
that constitute the foundational pillars and shared values of the United
States and the other industrialized democracies.' 5
Because the exact form of globalization is not a fixed certainty, the
United States and the other industrialized democracies should aggressively
configure globalization to be consistent with and to promote the values of
10. See infra notes 91, 132.
11. Value judgments (alternatively, beliefs, views, ideas, and opinions) about what is
"good" or "bad" are never statements of facts. See 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPlIY 229-32
(1967). Other characterizations of "good" or "bad" might be "appropriate" or "inappro-
priate," "correct" or "incorrect," "necessary" or "unnecessary," and "proper" or
"improper." The use of value judgments requires a person to base her decision on per-
sonal beliefs, whether or not these beliefs are her fundamental beliefs, beliefs widely
shared and deeply felt by other members of society, or beliefs supported by objective
evidence. See EzRA J. MiSHAN, INTRODUCnON To NoRmATIvE EcONOMICs 24-26 (1981)
(stating that value judgments are the product of, among other things, intellectual fash-
ions, life experience, specific events, and interests). See also THE MIT DICTIONARY OF
MODERN EcoNoICS 447-48 (David W. Pearce ed., 4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter DIcnONARY
OF MODERN ECONOMICS].
12. See infra notes 104-17 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 25.
14. See infra notes 118-28 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 26.
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liberal democracy. The industrialized democracies must also ensure that
the path of globalization fairly balances the values of free market econom-
ics, democracy, and human rights, while accommodating such vital con-
cerns as the protection of the environment, concerns that do not yet
generate as strong a global consensus as the three convergent values. 16
The mechanism for configuring globalization to conform to and to bal-
ance the values of liberal democracy consists of events and policies that,
while difficult to achieve, are not unrealistic and have, to a degree, already
been occurring. 17 A particularly useful event might be a catharsis that
would place the world into the next millennium without the baggage of the
past. Perhaps by the year 2001, the representatives of oppressors, victims,
victors, losers, and adversaries could assemble on a world stage in a thera-
peutic ceremony to put the past behind.18
Given their economic preeminence in the world, by acting in unison
the industrialized democracies should be able to determine the specific
content of globalization. Action from the industrialized democracies is
needed because a humane globalization will increase human wealth and
reduce human suffering.19 Morally, the promotion of liberal democratic
values and the perspective of a single human race would serve to repay the
historic debts that the industrialized countries have incurred over the past
centuries.20
At the same time, the industrialized democracies must be careful to
use their influence responsibly and sensitively, for the wisest ideas pur-
sued for the best motives may be rejected when unilaterally imposed upon
the rest of the world. Perceived economic and political "imperialism,"
though much less malevolent than military imperialism, will not be warmly
greeted. The primary vehicle for the industrialized democracies should be
the "rule of law"-assuming that they have a substantial, if not command-
ing voice in determining its underlying principles.
An enlightened globalization will not lead to the establishment of a
world government. It could, however, create a new attitude among human
beings and serve the interests of the United States.21 More profoundly,
advancing globalization will facilitate an event barely begun that holds the
great potential of constructing, in the distant future, the perspective that
the human race matters more than its component divisions along race, reli-
16. See infra notes 170-186 and accompanying text.
17. Some such possibilities are respect for the rule of law through support for multi-
lateral dispute settlement, vigorous financial and political support for countries in tran-
sition to liberal democracy, greater regional economic and political integration, and
structural changes in the United Nations. See generally Alex Y. Seita, Putting the Past
Behind and Humanizing Globalization (May 1, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
18. Nations, for example, could apologize for their historical debts and for historical
tragedies, and pledge reformed behavior in the twenty-first century. The ceremony
would not be restricted to nations but could also include governments, organizations,
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gion, or ethnicity.22 The vision of a common humanity is reason enough
to embrace globalization.
I. The Background of Globalization
Today, more than ever, the events of foreign lands have important eco-
nomic and political consequences for local inhabitants. To be sure, foreign
events have had significant ramifications in the past. Centuries ago, semi-
nal inventions in China revolutionized the culture, science, and warfare of
Europeans; the opening of American borders to European immigrants from
the 19th through the mid-20th centuries gave millions a new home; and the
conflicts in Europe during World War I eventually brought the United
States onto the European battleground.23
But these events were of sporadic importance. For example, after
World War I ended, the United States isolated itself in a number of respects
from international politics and trade; America declined membership in the
League of Nations and enacted the Smoot-Hawley tariffs in 1931 which
drastically reduced imports. 24 By contrast, transnational activities and
affairs now have continuous importance, repeatedly affecting not just dis-
tant countries, but also the entire global community at times. The continu-
ous importance of international events is a defining characteristic of
globalization.
Another feature of globalization with potentially profound implica-
tions is the convergence of basic economic and political values among
nations towards the liberal democratic values of the industrialized democ-
racies, the "West."25 For the West, the liberal, democratic values of market
22. See infra notes 104-17 and accompanying text.
23. See ROBERT TEMPLE, THE GENius OF CHINA: 3,000 YEARS OF SCIENCE, DISCOVERY
AND INVENTION 7, 149-51, 81-84, 110-16, 224-29 (1986) (discussing the seminal inven-
tions made by the Chinese, e.g., paper and printing, the magnetic compass, and gunpow-
der, and later utilized by Europeans); 1 BuREAu OF THE CENsus, U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE,
HISroIcAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TMIMES TO 1970, at 105 (1975)
(showing that the great majority of immigrants to the United States from 1820 to 1950
came from Europe) [hereinafter HISToRICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNIrrED STATES].
24. See UmnITE NATIONS, EvERYONE'S UNIrED NATIONS: A HANDBOOK ON THE WORK OF
THE UNTrn NATIONS 5 (10th ed. 1986) [hereinafter UNITED NATIONS]; JOHN H. JACKSON,
WoRm TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 9 (1969).
25. Identifying the most important industrialized democracies is easy, although
compiling a list of all the industrialized democracies may not be. The most important
industrialized democracies are members of the group of seven (G-7) nations: the United
States, Japan, Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Canada. See, e.g., INrERNA-
TIONaL MONErxY FuND, WoRLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOIC OCTOBER 1996, at 155-57 (1996)
[hereinafter WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK]. See generally C. FrD BERGsrEN & C. RANDALL
HENNING, GLOBAL ECONOMIC LEADERSHIm AND THE GROUP OF SEVEN (1996).
A good proxy for the major industrialized democracies is the group of 23 nations that
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) calls the "industrialized countries": the United
States, Japan, Canada, Australia, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and all 15
countries of the European Union. See WORLD ECONOMIC OuoOK, supra, at 155-57.
The fifteen nations of the European Union are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. See What Is the Economic Union? (visited Apr. 3,
1997) <http://europa.eu.int/en/eu/states.htm>. Although the European Union is not a
433
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economies, democracy, and human rights are fundamental. 26 Given the
arguably shallow roots of liberal democratic values in a number of coun-
tries and the absence of democracy and human rights in many others, this
process may perhaps be too incomplete to be described as a convergence of
"country," it possesses international legal personality, speaks for all member nations in
most external or international economic matters, and represents one step in a planned
path to a future entity with some characteristics of a single country (e.g., common citi-
zenship, a single monetary currency, a common defense policy). See generally Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11; Sin-
gle European Act, Feb. 17-28, 1986, 25 LL.M. 506; Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7,
1992, 31 I.L.M. 247, 253 (Maastricht Treaty); Europa Homepage (visited Dec. 8, 1996)
<http://europa.eu.int> (website for the European Union). While all 23 industrialized
countries are democracies that protect human rights, several of these have not been so
throughout the entire post-World War H- period (i.e., Greece, Portugal, and Spain had
military dictatorships for decades).
Another possible proxy for the industrialized democracies is the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD). See generally OECD Online (visited Jan.
20, 1997) <http://www.oecd.org> (website for the Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development). The 29 member nations of the OECD include the Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, South Korea, and Turkey, in addition to the IMF's 23
industrialized nations. See About OECD: Member Countries (visited Jan. 20, 1997)
<http://www.oecd.org/about/member-countries.html> (from OECD website). The
members of the OECD identify themselves as "governments of the industrialised democ-
racies" that seek, among other things, "co-operation among nations essentially on
domestic policies where these interact with those of other countries, in particular
through trade and investment." See About OECD: The OECD and its Origins (visited Jan.
20, 1997) <http://www.oecd.org/about/origins.htm> (from OECD website). This
description of "industrialized democracies" is reasonably accurate, although some
OECD countries may lack (or for a long time did lack) some democratic features and
human rights.
For convenience, this article describes the 23 IMF-designated industrialized nations
collectively as the "West," although that term is arguably misleading. Some commenta-
tors would reserve the term "West" exclusively for U.S. allies of European heritage or for
friendly but neutral European democracies with wealthy economies. They would
instead characterize nations like Japan, South Korea, and Turkey as part of the "Free
World." See Michael Lind, Pax Atlantica: The Case for Euramerica, WoRLD POL'Y J.,
Spring 1996, at 1-2. Unlike the other 22 nations, Japan is not predominately a cauca-
sian nation with European roots. It is also a country that has been frequently character-
ized, inaccurately, as being qualitatively different from the other 22 nations which are
supposed to be identical to each other. See, e.g., A Survey of Tomorrow's Japan, EcoNo-
tsr, July 13, 1996, at 5. For a discussion ofJapan's role in international affairs as well
as Japan's more important similarities with the other industrialized countries, see Alex
Y. Seita, Japan's Role in Globalization (May 1, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
Placing Japan solely in the "Free World," however, seems odd as that phrase also
describes an increasingly large number of countries whose economies are nowhere as
prosperous as most of the IMFs 23 industrialized countries, let alone Japan's. On the
other hand, Japan is an American ally, and the term "West" has often been used to
describe the U.S.-led alliance of wealthy industrialized nations. Using the term "West" to
describe the IMF's 23 industrialized nations avoids having to refer to "western and Japa-
nese" governments, corporations, .etc.
26. For example, the OECD (whose 29 members include all 23 nations of what this
article refers to collectively as the "industrialized democracies") states that its "member-
ship is not determined by wealth, but rather by what the Members have in common,
which is their commitment to an open market economy, pluralistic democracy and
respect for human rights." See About OECD: Member Countries (visited Jan. 20, 1997)
<http://www.oecd.org/about/member.htm>.
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fundamental values. Nevertheless, today there are greater similarities
between the economic and political systems of nations than at any other
time in the short history of globalization.27 With careful and generous
support from the West, this similarity of systems may evolve into a similar-
ity of fundamental values.
A. Globalization's Beginning
Identifying the birth of globalization is an elusive task, but one possible
date is the year 1945, when the United States led the Allied powers in creat-
ing the United Nations and its companion international organizations, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (World Bank).28 Later in 1948, the United
States and its democratic allies established the General Agreement on Tar-
27. The economic conflict between market and command economy paradigms has
ended in the former's favor. The classes of imperial powers and colonies that existed at
the end of World War II have vanished, and virtually all nations are now politically
independent. See infra note 65. Democracy, not authoritarianism, is the prevailing form
of government among nations. See infra note 59. With the end of the Cold War, the
protection of human rights has not had to compete with national security concerns, and
there has been at least pervasive formal recognition of the importance of human rights.
Cf. infra note 60.
28. See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 24, at 3 (United Nations Charter signed on June
26, 1945, in San Francisco, and the United Nations officially came into existence on
October 24, 1945); INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FuND, ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT (1968) (IMF
Articles of Agreement adopted onJuly 22, 1944, and entered into force on December 27,
1945) [hereinafter IMF ARTICLES OF AGaEMENrr]; SuSAN GEORGE & FABRIZIo SABELU,
FAITH AND CREDIT: THE WoRiD BAN'S SECULAR EMPIRE 33-36 (1994) (the Articles of
Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development were adopted
on July 22, 1944, and entered into force on Dec. 27, 1945). The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and its affiliates-the International Finance
Corporation (IFC, established in 1956), the International Development Association
(IDA, established in 1960), the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes (ICSID, established in 1966), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA, established in 1988)-are collectively known as the World Bank Group, and the
IBRD and the IDA together are collectively known as the World Bank. See WoD BANK,
ANNUAL REPORT 1996, at 6-7 [hereinafter WORLD BANK]; WORLD BANK GROUP, THE WORMD
BANK GRoup: LEARN'IGN FROM THE PAST, EMBRACING THE FuTuRE 3 (1994).
Membership in the IBRD is restricted to members of the IMF. See WoRm BANI,, INTER-
NATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT: ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. II,
§ 1 (1944) [hereinafter IBRD ARTICLES OF AGREEMENr]. In turn, membership in the IFC,
IDA, and MIGA is restricted to members of the IBRD. See INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CoRPO-
RATION, ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. II, § 1 (1956); INTmRNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AssocIA-
TION, ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. II § 1 (1960); MuL EATERAL lNVESTMENr GuARANTEE
AGENCY, CONVENTION ESTABLISHING THE MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GuARANTEE AGENCY art.
4 (1985). Contracting states that have signed ICSID need not be members of the IBRD.
See INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, REPORT OF THE ExEcu-
TrVE DIRECORS ON TE CONVENTION ON THE SETTLmENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN
STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES art. 67 (1965).
Both the IMF and the IBRD were products of the United Nations Monetary and Finan-
cial Conference held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, from July 1-22, 1944, under
the leadership of the United States. See generally U.S. DEPARTmENr OF STATE, PUB. No.
2866, PROCEEDINGS AND DocUMENTs OF TE UNITED NATIONS MONETARY AND FINANCIAL
CONFERENCE, BRErTON WOODS, NEw HAMPSHIRE, JuLY 1-22, 1944 (1948). Though ini-
tially involved in the process of creating the IMF and the IBRD, the Soviet Union later
declined to join either institution, choosing instead to exercise its political influence
Cornell International Law Journal
iffs and Trade (GATT), another important economic institution for global-
ization along with the IMF and the World Bank.29 The motivations for
creating these international institutions were at once noble and selfish.
After the devastating experience of World War 11, the victorious Allies
were determined to prevent any reoccurrence of similar world wars. Their
motivating hope was that a collegial body of nations would ensure the
peaceful resolution of conflicts and provide a collective defense against
wrongful aggression.30 Thus, the United Nations was the focus of political
attempts to prevent future acts of aggression. Further, unlike the League of
Nations, the United Nations made the promotion of human rights one of
its basic purposes.31 Toward that end, the United Nations created various
human rights institutions and generated human rights conventions and
through its position as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. See HARoLD
JAMES, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION SINcE BRETTON WOODs 48-58 (1996).
29. Originally, the United States and its western allies had planned to establish the
International Trade Organization (ITO), an international institution comparable in stat-
ute to the IMF and the IBRD, with the responsibility of promoting international trade.
The ITO, however, was never established due to the refusal of the United States to
approve it. Instead, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)-the trade
treaty that would have been administered by the ffO-became a de facto organization
devoted to the expansion of world trade. SeeJACKSON, supra note 24, at 36-53. See gener-
ally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. The GATT was authenticated on October 30, 1947,
and entered into force on January 1, 1948, with the United States as one of the original
contracting parties (members). JACKSON, supra note 24, at 45,899. As with the IMF and
the IBRD, the Soviet Union declined to join the GATT. See id. at 898-901. Years later,
the World Trade Organization (WTO), the modern-day equivalent of the ITO, emerged
from the GATT Uruguay Round Agreements and was established on January 1, 1995.
Cf. Open for Business, WTO Focus (World Trade Org.), Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 4. The agree-
ment establishing the WTO includes a number of agreements that cover specific trade
issues. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 13, 15-16 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. "Multilateral" agree-
ments apply to all WTO members and "plurilateral" agreements apply only to members
that have accepted them. See WTO Agreement, supra, art. II, paras. 2-3. All references to
GATT in this article are to the original GATT treaty of 1947 (GATT 1947), and not to the
legally distinct GATT 1994 agreement. The latter is part of the WTO Agreement and
contains, among other things, all of the provisions of GATT 1947. Compare WTO Agree-
ment, supra, art. II, para. 4, with General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Agree-
ments on Trade in Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, §1, 33 I.L.M. 29 (1994).
30. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER pmbl.; RosEMARY RIGHTER, UTOPIA Losr: THE UNITED
NATIONS AND WORD ORDER 311-13 (1995). See generally U.N. CHARTER arts. 33-38
(Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement of Disputes), 39-51 (Chapter VII: Action with Respect to
Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression). For a comprehen-
sive treatment of the pervasive role the United States played in the establishment of the
U.N. Charter, see RUTH B. RussEnL & JEANNErTE E. MumER, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CHARTR: THE RoLE OF Tm UNnD STATES 1940-1945 (1958).
31. One of the purposes of the United Nations is "[t]o achieve international coopera-
tion in... promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion." U.N. CHARTER
art. 1, para. 3; see also id. arts. 13 para. 1b, 55 para. c, 55, 76 para. c. The covenant of
the League of Nations had no comparable purpose or general provisions dealing with
human rights. See RUTm B. HENIG, LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT 179-89 (1973). There
were, however, articles that touched on human rights concerns. See id. arts. 22 (colonies
of defeated nations in World War I to be administered by the victors in a manner consis-
Vol. 30
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declarations. 32
At the same time, the Allies thought it critical to lay the foundations
for the economic prosperity of the international community.33 Prosperous
countries, it was thought, would be less inclined to wage wars. Thus, the
Allies promoted activities that would raise the standard of living among
peaceful countries. For example, the Allies established international eco-
nomic institutions which were in part created to promote international
monetary cooperation (the IMF), to foster economic development in less
developed countries (the World Bank), and to increase international trade
(the GATT). 34
tent with the "well-being and development of [the native] peoples"), 23 ("fair and
humane conditions of labour for men, women, and children").
32. For example, the U.N. Commissions on Human Rights and on the Status of
Women were established in 1946. See FPANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNA-
rIoNA. HUmAN RiGHTS 5-8 (1990). Also, many human rights conventions and declara-
tions have emerged from the United Nations. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217 III(A), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 127, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/
810 (1948); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
G.A. Res. 2670, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 174, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1948); Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A(XXI), 21
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1966);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966); International
Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106
A(XX), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1965). The full texts of all of these conventions, as well as
other human rights instruments, can be found at the United Nations human rights web-
site. See Welcome to the United Nations Human Rights Website (visited Dec. 11, 1996)
<http://193.135.156.15/welcome.htm> (U.N. website containing information relating to
human rights, including "the full texts of over 90 international human rights treaties,
declarations and principles, as well as their status of ratification").
33. See JAm.s, supra note 28, at 27-57.
34. See IMF AzRnct.s OF AGRaEanmr, supra note 28, art. I (purpose of IMF); IBRD
AiRnct.s oF AGREEENT, supra note 28, art. I (purpose of IBRD); GATT, supra note 24,
pmbl. (purpose of GATT). Immediately after the end of World War II, the more pressing
priority of these two institutions was to help rebuild countries ravaged by war. See, e.g.,
IBRD Axnct.Es oF AGREm-ENT, supra note 28, arts. I(i), (v). By initial design,
[T]he [IMF] is an adjustment institution whose short-term loans are directed to
financing deficits that are either inherently temporary or intended to be tempo-
rary because of the adoption of adjustment policies, [while] the World Bank is a
development institution whose long-term loans are directed to the promotion of
development....
This division of labor became blurred after 1974.
John Williamson, The Lending Policies of the International Monetary Fund, in IMF Comoi-
TnoNALrrY 605, 617 (John Williamson ed., 1983) (emphasis in original). Over the years,
there has been considerable convergence in the activities of the IMF and the World Bank
as it has become clear that macroeconomic adjustment and balance of payments
problems (IMF areas of expertise) are linked to economic development and
microeconomic policies concerning investrient in such areas as infrastructure, training,
and education (World Bank areas of expertise). Also, the constituencies of the two insti-
tutions have converged. Originally concerned with the problems of all countries, the
IMF now only provides funds to developing or poor countries (including former commu-
nist countries). Thus, its constituencies are the same as those of the World Bank See
JAws, supra note 28, at 143-44, 325-27, 527-29. See generally INTERNATIoNAL MoNUraY
FUND, ANmAL REPORT 1996, at 3 (1996) [hereinafter IMF] (the International.Monetary
Fund provides funds to low-income and heavily indebted poor countries, including
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The creation of the United Nations, the IMF, the World Bank, and the
GATT were key moments in globalization. These institutions signaled the
start of an era of cooperative behavior, however imperfect, among nations.
While the number of nations involved was limited, their cooperation
required the development and formal recognition of common interests.
The GATT and the United Nations, in particular, were critical components
in the genesis of globalization.35 In seeking to reduce barriers to trade of
goods, the GATT contained free market principles that favored lower tar-
iffs, banned quotas, and prohibited discrimination against foreign goods.36
The United Nations, at least on paper, championed the principles of
human rights and democratic forms of government.37 As these principles
countries in transition from command to market economies, to help them cope with
balance of payments problems); WOID BANK, supra note 28, at 6 (the central purpose of
the World Bank Group is to promote economic and social progress in developing coun-
tries by offering them loans, grants, co-investment financing, and investment insurance).
35. Of course, the GATT was not the only factor in economic globalization. The
European Community Treaties were instrumental to integrating the markets of western
Europe, and the United States opened its huge domestic market to imports from allied
and neutral countries. See, e.g., STEPHEN D. COHEN Er AL., FunAmENrmLs oF U.S. FOR
EIGN TRADE POLCY. EcoNobucs, Pourmcs, LAws, AND ISSUES 34-38 (1996); Gary Clyde
Hufbauer, An Overview, in EUROPE 1992: AN AMERICAN PERsPEcrnv 1-3 (Gary Clyde Huf-
bauer ed., 1990). Also, the Marshall Plan and similar aid programs from the United
States, along with some support from the World Bank and IMF, helped to rebuild war-
shattered economies, whose recovery led to greater international trade. See, e.g., JAMES,
supra note 28, at 72-84; Alex Y. Seita, Discussing Japan Rationally, 25 L. & PoL'Y INT'L
Bus. 193, 211 n.84 (1993).
36. See, e.g., GATT, supra note 24, arts. I, I, I1, XI. Articles I and Ill banned discrim-
ination based on foreign origin and nationality, respectively. Under the most-favored-
nation rule of article I, a contracting party to GATT was obligated to treat the imports
from or exports to all other contracting parties no less favorably than it treated the
imports or exports of any trading partner (whether a GATT contracting party or not).
The national treatment rule of article Il required a contracting party to treat imported
goods, once through customs, no less favorably than domestic goods (subject to a gov-
ernment procurement exception). Under article II, tariffs could be no higher than the
maximum tariffs listed by a contracting party in its tariff schedules. A contracting party
determined its tariff schedules after negotiating with other contracting parties, and
through reciprocity, lowered its maximum tariffs if other contracting parties did like-
wise. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE Wom TRADING SYsnm: LAw AND POuCY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONoMIc RELATIONS 117-26 (1989). See generally WIuJAM R. CLINE Er AL., TADE
NEGoio-oNs IN THE TOKYO ROUND: A QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT (1978). Article XI gen-
erally forbade quantitative restrictions (quotas). There were, of course, important
exceptions to GATT's general efforts to reduce barriers, and GATT did not cover trade in
services and did not adequately handle the issue of liberalizing trade in agriculture, or
textiles and apparel See generally WomD AGRICULTURE TRADE: BUILDING A CONSENSUS
(William M. Miner & Dale E. Hathaway eds., 1988); DALE E. HATHAWAY, AGRICULTURE
AND THE GATT: REwRrrING THE RULES (1987); WI.uAM R. CLINE, THE FurURE OF WoRLD
TRADE IN TEXTILEs AND APPAREL (1987).
37. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 32, arts. 2 (no dis-
crimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, etc.), 3 (right to life, liberty, and personal
safety), 4 (freedom from slavery), 5 (freedom from torture), 7 (equal protection under
the law), 10 (right to fair and public criminal proceeding), 18 (freedom of religion), 19
(freedom of expression), 20 (freedom of assembly and association), 21 (right to a demo-
cratic government), 23 (right to work, to have just conditions of work, and to form
unions), 25 (right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being, includ-
ing food and medical care), 26 (right to education). The boundaries of human rights are
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gained international acceptance, economic and political norms developed.
That is, common values emerged.
B. Economic Globalization
In current usage, the term globalization refers primarily to economic
globalization. As barriers to trade, investment, financial flows, and tech-
nology transfers have fallen, there has been an expansion of markets for
goods, services, financial capital, and intellectual property to transnational,
regional, and even global dimensions.38 There are several hallmarks of
economic globalization. First, it increases opportunities for sellers as well
as buyers. Second, economic globalization simultaneously creates new
competition. Third, it develops interdependency among nations. Finally,
economic globalization spreads the ideology of the free market economy
model because the industrialized nations, the major promoters of global-
ization, advocate free market policies.
The enlargement of markets beyond national boundaries means that
both sellers and buyers have greater choices. More firms issue equity
the matter of some debate. See, e.g., infra note 184 and sources cited (whether protec-
tion of the environment is a "human right"); Burns H. Weston, Human Rights, in HuMAN
RIGHTS IN THE WORLD CommuNIY: ISSUES AND AcTION 14, 17-18 (Richard P. Claude &
Burns H. Weston eds., 2d ed. 1992). No single human right is absolute, since rights
must eventually conflict and one right would otherwise dominate all other rights.
Human rights can be divided into three broad categories: personal security rights (e.g.,
freedom from torture, slavery, arbitrary arrest), civil and political liberties (e.g., freedom
of expression, religion, participation in government), and depending on the affluence of
the country, economic or welfare rights (e.g., right to food, shelter, health care, educa-
tion). See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Right, supra note 32; HuMAN RIGHTS AND
U.S. FOREIGN Pouc"Y. PRINciPLES AND APPLCATIONs xviii-xxi (Peter G. Brown & Douglas
MacLean eds., 1979). Core human rights-those generally recognized as human rights-
are sometimes characterized as first and second-generation rights, while emerging or
potential human rights are called third-generation rights. Cf. Weston, supra, at 18-20;
supra note 184.
38. With the establishment of the World Trade Organization and the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement, the continuing integration of the European Union, and
regional declarations of free trade (e.g., the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum,
APEC), the long-term trend dearly points to the globalization of markets, the geographi-
cal expansion of markets to include more competitors and consumers. See Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., KAV 270(s),
27 LL.M. 281 (treaty integrating Canadian and American markets); North American
Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., KAV 3417(s), 32 LL.M.
289 (treaty integrating American, Canadian, and Mexican markets); supra note 25 (trea-
ties integrating the markets of the various European Union countries); WTO Agreement,
supra note 29. See generally Yoicm FUNABASHi, ASIA PACIFIc FUSION: JAPAN'S ROLE IN
APEC (1995); Jom S. WILSON, STANDARDS AND APEC: AN ACrION AGENDA (1995). More
markets will cover a greater number of countries because barriers to those market com-
modities will continue to fall, whether or not these are tariffs, legal barriers, or cultural
barriers. The reduction of market barriers will widen the geographic areas for markets,
in some cases, to world-wide dimensions. Markets will become freer for both sellers and
buyers. Companies will be able to sell products to customers in more countries. Busi-
nesses and individuals will also be able to buy commodities and services from a greater
number of countries. More products will have global markets-notjust commodities like
automobiles, airplanes, computers, and securities.
Cornell International Law Journal
securities in, or obtain financing from, international markets.39 They also
find it profitable to sell their goods and services in, or buy their raw materi-
als or components from, international markets. Worldwide trade now
amounts to an astonishingly large figure, six trillion dollars in 1995, more
than 80% the size of the gross domestic product of the United States, the
world's largest economy.40
The existence of greater choice also extends to investment opportuni-
ties. Companies are investing in foreign countries, buying assets such as
securities, businesses, facilities, and land, and have shifted production to
39. This is an example of international financial integration. See, e.g., HAL S. SCOTT
& PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE TRANSACTIONS, PoucY, AND REGULATIONS
(3rd ed. 1996); RICHARD J. HERRING & ROBERT E. LITAN, FINANCIAl. REGULATION IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 13-48 (1995).
40. The gross domestic product of the United States was $7,245.8 billion in 1995.
See National Income and Product Accounts, SuRvEY oF CURRENT BUsINESS, July 1996, at 5
tbl. 1.1 (Bur. Econ. Anal., U.S. Dep't Com.) [hereinafter SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS,
July 1996]. The United States has the world's largest economy, accounting for, by one
measure, 21.3% of world gross domestic product in 1995. See, e.g., WORLD ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK, supra note 25, at 156.
From 1992 to 1995, total world exports of merchandise and commercial services
amounted to the following (in billions of dollars):
1992 1993 1994 1995
Merchandise 3,655 3,630 4,090 4,875
Commercial Services 1,017 1,000 1,080 1,230
See Overview of World Trade in 1995 and Outlook for 1996, WTO Focus, May 1996, at 2
tbl. 1 (World Trade Org.) (data for 1993-95) [hereinafter WTO Focus, May 1996]; Over-
view of World Trade in 1994 and Outlook for 1995, WTO Focus, Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 5 tbl.
1 (World Trade Org.) (data for 1992) [hereinafter WTO Focus, Mar.-Apr. 1995]. Theo-
retically, total world exports should equal total world imports. In practice, however,
total world exports differ from total world imports because of differences in evaluation,
definition, and data collection. See WTO Focus, May 1996, supra, at 4 tbl. 3 (giving
total world imports of merchandise at $5,015 billion for 1995).
Merchandise trade consists of goods-manufactured goods and primary commodities
such as minerals or agricultural, fishery, and forestry products. Commercial services
fall into broad categories of transportation, travel (tourism), and other private services
(insurance, banking, telecommunications, etc.) and income. Cf. id. at 3-4; WTO Focus,
Mar.-Apr. 1995, supra at 5. In 1994, the six leading exporters and importers of commer-
cial services, in billions of dollars (value) and as percentages of total world trade in
commercial services (share), were as follows:
1994 EXPORTS 1994 IMPORTS ExPORTS & IMPORTS
VALUE SHARE VALuE SHARE CoMBINE' VAzUE
United States 178.2 16.5 125.0 12.0 303.2
Japan 57.2 5.3 109.2 10.5 166.4
France 89.1 8.3 69.9 6.7 159.0
Germany 53.1 4.9 98.8 9.5 151.9
Italy 59.1 5.5 58.0 5.6 117.1
United Kingdom 58.6 5.4 50.8 4.9 109.4
See WTO Focus, May 1996, supra, at 8 tbl. 7.
In 1995, exports and imports of merchandise trade were as follows for the European
Union and the following countries:
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foreign factories. 41 Concurrently, sellers of such domestic assets now have
1995 ExPORTS OF 1995 IMPORTS OF
MERCH"DISE MERCHANDISE
TRADE- (I BILLIONS OF RADE (IN BI.LIONS OF
DOLLA S) DOLLARS)
European Union 750.8 736.1
United States 583.9 770.8
Japan 443.0 335.9
China 148.8 132.0
Russia Federation 80.2 55.7
See id. at 6 tbl. 5 (export and import data for Russian Federation; figure includes trade
with former republics of the USSR), 7 tbl. 6 (export and import data for all but Russia;
European Union figures exclude intra-European Union trade).
41. For example, consider the total foreign direct investment (FDI) positions of the
United States and Japan in 1995:
FDI N CouNmY FDIABROAD
United States $560.1 billion $711.6 billion
Japan $ 34.1 billion $463.6 billion
See SURVEY OF CURRENT BusINEss, July 1996, supra note 40, at 47 tbl. 3, 50 tbl. 4 (giving
total foreign direct investment in the United States and total American foreign direct
investment abroad by historical cost at year-end 1995); Jon Choy, Foreign Direct Invest-
ment in Japan Rebounds,JAP.AN EcoN. INs.,July 21, 1995, No. 27B, at 8, 9 (giving foreign
direct investment inJapan as of March 31, 1995, based on notifications, not actual trans-
actions, and excluding disinvestments); Japan's FY 1994 Foreign Direct Investment, JAPAN
ECON. Is-r., July 7, 1995, No. 25B, at 6, 7 (giving Japanese foreign direct investment
abroad as of March 31, 1995, based on notifications, not actual transactions, and
excluding disinvestments). Foreign direct investment is foreign investment in domestic
real estate, businesses, and factories (as contrasted with "portfolio investment," foreign
investment in domestic financial assets such as stocks and bonds). A more technical
definition is that a foreign resident has ownership or control, directly or indirectly, of
10% or more of the voting securities of a domestic corporation or the equivalent interest
in an unincorporated domestic business. See RaymondJ. Mataloni, Jr., A Guide to BEA
Statistics on U.S. Multinational Companies, SURVEY OF CuRREar BusINEss, Mar. 1995, at
38 (Bur. Econ. Anal., U.S. Dep't Cor.).
As a percentage of all direct investment, the figure for foreign direct investment in
Japan is among the lowest for the industrialized countries. In most industrialized coun-
tries, foreign direct investment has had a long and substantial presence. Since the
1980s, the United States has experienced a substantial increase in foreign direct invest-
ment. See EDWARD M. GRAHAM & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, FOREIGN DmIcr INvESTMENT IN THE
UNrT= STATES 31-33 (3d ed. 1995). The shares of foreign-owned firms for manufactur-
ing sales, value added, and employment in France, the United Kingdom, and the United
States were as follows for 1985 and 1990 (in percentages):
VALUE
SALES ADDED E m vT
1985 1990 1985 1990 1985 1990
France 26.7 28.4 25.3 27.1 21.1 23.7
United Kingdom 20.3 24.1 18.7 21.1 14.0 14.9
United States 8.0 16.4 8.3 13.4 8.0 10.8
See id. at 33 tbl. 1.9.
The manufacturing companies of most developed countries produce a substantial per-
centage of their output in foreign countries. See Douglas Ostrom, MITI Looks to United
States, Europe for Lessons on Restructuring, JAPAN ECON. INsr., June 21, 1996, No. 23B, at
3 (reporting that in 1994 manufacturing companies of Japan, Germany, and the United
States produced 7.9%, 17.5%, and 20.1%, respectively, of their output outside of their
home country). EvenJapanese companies, which have been latecomers in shifting man-
ufacturing production overseas, now produce more in foreign factories than the total
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more buyers to choose from. The liberalization of investment opportuni-
ties-the removal of barriers-contributes to the liberalization of trade, and
vice versa.4 2
Expanding markets simultaneously generates more competition along
with more opportunities;4 3 domestic firms must compete not only with
domestic but also foreign rivals. While benefiting domestic consumers,
foreign competition riay threaten domestic businesses and employees.
44
Whether the foreign competition comes from imports or the local subsidi-
aries of foreign corporations, employees of domestic firms may lose their
jobs as these firms lay off surplus employees in order to become more com-
petitive.4 5 Where local subsidiaries of foreign corporations provide com-
petition, however, these subsidiaries will create new jobs that replace, in
amount of Japanese exports. For example, Japanese manufacturing companies pro-
duced Y41.2 trillion worth of goods in overseas plants in fiscal year 1995 (ending in
March 1996), a figure greater than the total amount of exports fromiJapan, Y39.6 trillion
($412 billion and $396 billion, respectively, using a $1 = Y100 exchange rate, cf. Cur-
rency Markets, N.Y. Tnms, Apr. 2, 1997, at D17 (as of April 1, one dollar was worth
about Y120)). See Sumie Kawakami, Exporting a Surplus [Focus Japan], FAR EAsT. EcoN.
REv., July 4, 1996, at 44.
42. See Globalisation: Creating a Borderless World?, OECD LErrE, Aug.-Sept. 1996,
at 4 (Org. Econ. Co-Op. & Dev.).
43. See PoRTER, supra note 2, at 7-9.
44. Even buyers can face increased competition, in that they may incur higher costs
from increased competition. For example, oil from Russia need no longer be sold at
subsidized prices to former Soviet allies. See Beth Knobel, Unpaid Energy Bills Split Rus-
sia, Neighbors, LA. TnmEs, Apr. 14, 1994, at D5.
45. Compare, for example, employment and revenues at several of America's largest
corporations in 1978 with 1995.
No. oF E PLo Ys REvFuENs ($ MILLoNs)
1978 1995 1978 1995
General Motors 839,000 709,000 63,221.1 168,828.6
Ford Motors 506,531 346,990 42,784.1 137,131.0
International
Business Machines 325,170 252,215 21,076.1 71,940.0
General Electric 401,000 222,000 19,653.8 70,028.0
Chrysler 157,958 126,000 16,340.7 53,195.0
See Fortune's Global 500: The World's Largest Corporations, FoRTuNE, Aug. 5, 1996, at
102, F-1, F-11 (data for 1995 fiscal year ending on or before March 31, 1996) [hereinaf-
ter Global 500]; Peter Dworkin, The Fortune Directory of the 500 Largest U.S. Industrial
Corporations, FoRTuNE, May 7, 1979, at 268, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fortun
File (data for 1978). Employment went down as sales (adjusted for inflation) went up.
From March 1979 (end of fiscal year 1978) to March 1996 (end of fiscal year 1995), the
consumer price index changed from 69.8 to 155.7, an increase of about 123%. See
Bureau of Labor Statistics Data (visited Oct. 15, 1996) <http://stats.bls.gov:80/cgi-bin/
surveymost> (website for Bureau of Labor Statistics, providing consumer price index for
all urban consumers). The five companies listed above increased their sales by consider-
ably more than 123%, and four out of five increased sales by over 200%.
Downsizing, of course, is not restricted to the United States. For many employees, not
just in America but also in Japan and Europe, globalization has been a bane, exposing
them to foreign competition and throwing them out of work See, e.g., Teresa Watanabe
& David Holley, Japanese Jolted by Demands of Future: As Nation Recovers from Brutal
Recession, Traditional Business Practices Mean Little, Older Men Lose Guarantees on Pay,
Jobs, Respect, L.A. Tims, July 14, 1996, at Al; Joan Warner et al., Clinging to the Safety
Net, Bus. Wy., Mar. 11, 1996, at 62 (regarding European workers).
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part, jobs lost at domestic firms.46 One of the major consequences of
increased foreign competition and the domestic drive for efficiency is that
countries have become more willing to privatize and deregulate.4 7
By making foreign countries important sources of consumers, inves-
tors, and suppliers, globalization creates interdependence. When domestic
businesses buy from and sell to foreign markets, their financial welfare
becomes linked to those markets. More domestic companies have evolved
into multinational corporations, firms that have economic interests in sev-
eral countries. Businesses set up partnerships with foreign firms, to share
technology and risk, in order to create new products.4 8 Because customers
as well as suppliers are foreign, firms in one country become economically
dependent upon firms in other countries. When foreign firms likewise
become dependent upon domestic markets, interdependence is established
as the economic prosperity of one nation becomes connected to that of
other countries. For virtually all countries, transnational trade is impor-
tant, if not vital, to their economic prosperity.4 9
As economic globalization integrates various national markets into
regional or world-wide markets, it also promotes general free market prin-
46. In 1994, nonbank U.S. affiliates of foreign companies employed 4,867,000
American workers, or 5.0% of the total nonbank employment in the United States. See
SuRvEy oF CuRRNT Busnimss, July 1996, supra note 40, at 102, 113 tbl. 13. In many
cases, foreign subsidiaries will pay higher wages than local firms. See Ned G. Howen-
stine & Dale P. Shannon, Differences in Foreign-Owned U.S. Manufacturing Establish-
ments by Country of Owner, SURVEY OF CuRtmRu BuSINEss, Mar. 1996, at 43 (Bur. Econ.
Anal., U.S. Dep't Com.) (reporting that the "U.S. manufacturing establishments of each
of the major investing countries [Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and
the United Kingdom] tend to be much larger, pay higher wages, and be more productive
than the U.S.-owned establishments").
47. See infra note 52.
48. See, e.g., Brian Bremner et al., Keiretsu Connections: The Bonds Between the U.S.
and Japan's Industry Groups, Bus. Wy-, July 22, 1996, at 52 (numerous tie-ups between
U.S. and Japanese multinational companies); Darryl Gibson, A Profitable Window [Focus
Japan], Fa EAsr. Eco. REv.,July 4, 1996, at 48 (joint ventures involving U.S. and Japa-
nese firms, Chinese and Japanese firms, and U.S., German, and Japanese firms); NTT,
IBM Japan Tie up in Small Information Device Field, JAPAN EcoN. NEavswvmE June 26,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone
Corp. of Japan and IBM Japan Ltd. will jointly develop and sell advanced portable infor-
mation equipment called personal digital assistants, PDAs, which can be linked with
mobile phones and computers); US, Japanese, Korean Chipmakers Join to Create Faster
Memory Chips, COMPuTERGRAM INTERNAnoNAL, June 25, 1996, at No. 2941, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (an international consortium of U.S., Japanese and
South Korean companies will develop a memory chip with two to five times faster access
times and transfer rates by the year 2000-the participants are Texas Instruments,
Micron Technology, and Apple Computer of the United States; Fujitsu and Mitsubishi
Electric of Japan; and Hyundai Electronics Industry and Samsung Electronics of South
Korea); Evelyn Iritani & Karen Kaplan, NEC to Merge its PC Unit with Packard Bell Com-
puters: The Move by the Big Japanese Firm Is a Financial Boost for the Struggling Sacra-
mento Company, L.A. Tmos, June 5, 1996, at D1 (NEC of Japan will merge its personal
computer division with Packard Bell of the United States to create an $8 billion-a-year
company, Packard Bell NEC). Of course, there are numerous purely domestic alliances
as well.
49. For example, the United States had the following total exports and imports of
merchandise and services, and GDP for 1992-95:
.443
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ciples, such as the quintessential concept of the market mechanism to allo-
cate resources,50 reduce protectionism in international trade,51 and
Exports and Imports (Billions of Dollars) for Years 1992-95
1992 1993 1994 1995
Merchandise Exports 440.4 456.8 502.5 575.9
Imports 536.5 589.4 668.6 749.4
Services Exports 177.3 186.1 195.8 210.6
Imports 119.5 125.5 134.1 142.2
TOTAL TRADE: 1273.7 1357.8 1501 1678.1
Exports & Imports of
Merchandise and
Services
GDP 6244.4 6550.2 6931.4 7245.8
TOTAL TRADE as % of 20.5% 20.8% 21.8% 23.2%
GDP I
See SURvEY OF Cuan'rr BusrNss, July 1996, supra note 40, at 5 tbl. 1.1, 68 tbl. 1 (GDP
data for 1994-95, and trade data for 1992-95); National Income and Product Accounts,
SuRvEy OF CuRuENT Busmnss, Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 36 tbl. 1.1 (Bur. Econ. Anal., U.S. Dep't
Com.) (GDP data for 1992-93). The definition of services differs from that of the World
Trade Organization for commercial services, e.g., by including certain military goods.
See SuRvEY oF Cuusr Busnwss, July 1996, supra note 40, at 68 tbl. 1, 87 n.3. The
figure for 1995 merchandise trade also differs by 10/o-3% from that of the WTO, primar-
ily due to different methods of calculation. See generally supra note 40 (WTO trade
figures). Figures from different organizations often differ because of varying definitions
and methods of calculations.
50. The industrialized democracies are more accurately described as having mixed
economies which utilize markets as well as government bureaucrats to allocate economic
resources (and perhaps, a bit of custom as well). These countries are, however, charac-
terized as market economies (or having free markets), to distinguish them from the com-
mand (or planned) economies which utilized bureaucrats much more heavily. See PAUL
A. SAMUa.SON & WILLt D. NoRDHAus, ECONOMICS 25, 38-48 (13th ed. 1989); THE NEw
PALGRAVE PROBLEMS OF THE PLANNED ECONOMY at xi-xiii (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1990).
An ideal type of market is the microeconomic concept of a perfectly competitive market,
that is,
a market in which perfect competition exists. The traditional conditions for per-
fect competition are rather stringent: all items sold must be exactly alike in
order to avoid product differentiation; there must be numerous buyers and sell-
ers to prevent any one buyer or seller from influencing the market price; entry or
exit barriers to the market must be absent to allow resources like labor or raw
materials to enter or leave the market quickly; and market participants must
have accurate and instantaneous knowledge of important information, such as
the market-determined price of the commodity. The virtue of perfect competi-
tion is that it efficiently allocates resources and that it maximizes the welfare of
society with respect to the particular market commodity being sold.
Two other important conditions are also implicit in the concept of perfect
competition. First, market prices must account for all costs and benefits associ-
ated with the sale of the market commodity. Second, market commodities must
not be "public goods" which are freely available to all. If these two conditions
are not met, an efficient allocation of resources does not occur.
Although these conditions indicate that perfect competition exists nowhere in
our world, the ideal of a perfectly competitive market yields useful and accurate
predictions when applied to markets that closely resemble it. The stock and
foreign exchange markets are often cited by economists as examples which
approach perfect competition.
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privatize and deregulate.52 Well before the collapse of the Soviet Union or
even the end of the Cold War, the market economy (free market) paradigm
of the West emerged as the decisive winner in the economic contest with
the command (or planned) economy paradigm of the Soviet bloc.5 3 Since
globalization is being led by the corporations and governments in the capi-
talist economies of the industrialized democracies, it naturally advocates
the ideology of the winners rather than the losers. Thus, the rules underly-
ing globalization seek to expand markets among market economy rather
than command economy principles.54
For example, the WTO espouses the implementation of free-market
ground rules to cover international trade and trade-related aspects of
Alex Y. Seita, Common Myths in the Economic Analysis of Law, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REV. 993,
1041-43 (footnotes omitted).
51. Free trade among nations, unimpeded by protectionism, follows the theory of
comparative advantage, an important economic principle originating from David
Ricardo nearly 180 years ago. See, e.g., PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFEL, IN'mNA-
TIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY Am POUCY 13-35 (1988); Russa'. D. ROBERTS, THE CHOICE"
A FABLE OF FREE TRADE AND PROTECTIONISM (1994) (an entertaining discussion of free
trade and protectionism). Free trade is consistent with the concept that a market mecha-
nism should make resource allocation decisions, e.g., that a market of buyer and sellers
should determine what commodities should be sold and at what prices. When a govern-
ment erects trade barriers-whether tariffs, nontariff barriers such as quotas, discrimina-
tory standards or regulations, or local content requirements-the government, not the
market, is adding an effective price increase to imported goods. See KRUGMAN &
OBSTFELD, supra, at 184-98.
52. Decreasing government ownership (privatization) and control (deregulation) of
industries is also consistent with the idea that the market should make production and
purchasing decisions. Privatization places state-owned or controlled companies, facto-
ries, and facilities in the hands of private ownership. See DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECO-
NOMICS, supra note 11, at 345. It follows the free market paradigm because the means of
production are supposed to be in the hands of private entrepreneurs in a market econ-
omy. On a worldwide basis, privatization has accelerated recently, especially in coun-
tries where government ownership of productive facilities was formerly pervasive. See,
e.g., CosMo GRAHAM & TONY PROSSER, PRIVATIZING PUBLIC ENTERPRISES: CONSTIrrUIONS,
THE STATE, AND REGULATION IN COMPARA-IVE PERSPECTIVE 1 (1991); Ernst & Young, The
Global Sweep of Privatization, EuROMONY, July 1990, supp. 1. Government control of an
industry, such as by limiting the number of competitors (including foreign competitors)
or the areas of competition, creates entry barriers to industry-a clear departure not just
from the perfect market paradigm but also from the general notion that in a market
economy the number of sellers should not be limited. Deregulation removes such gov-
ernmentally imposed barriers to entry. See DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS, supra
note 11, at 104. To a lesser extent, there has also been increased deregulation. See, e.g.,
RICHARD H. K. VarroR, CONTRIVED COMPErmON: REGULATION AND DEREGULATION IN
AMERICA (1994); KYNm BUTTON, AIRINE DEREGULATION: THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERI-
ENCE (1991).
53. See generally Gregory Grossman, Command Economy, in THE NEw PALGRAVE:
PROBLEMS OF THE PLANNED ECONOMY at 58 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1990).
54. If the command market model had proven superior to free market model in eco-
nomic performance, globalization today would have a dramatically different appearance.
There would be a global system that fosters greater trade and economic cooperation
among command economies, and its rules would have underlying Marxist, not capital-
ist, premises. After all, the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation tried to
promote greater trade among nations with command economies. See, e.g., JoANNE
GoWA, ALLIES, ADvERSARES, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3, 116, 120 (1994).
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investment and intellectual property.55 Its rules go further than those of
the GATT, its predecessor in carrying out the free market principle of com-
parative advantage by stamping out protectionism among nations. 56
When tools of protectionism-such as tariffs, quotas, or domestic subsi-
dies-are reduced, foreign imports can better enter a domestic market, cre-
ating more competition for local firms. The presence of increased
competition contributes to the development of more efficient local firms as
only the fittest firms will survive in a competitive marketplace. The use of a
market and consumer choice, rather than a bureaucracy, to determine the
survival of firms and products is the essence of a free market.5 7 Not sur-
prisingly, the various WTO agreements are expected to substantially
55. The IMF and the World Bank, too, have promoted market economy principles.
See, e.g., JAm.s supra note 28, at 323 (IMP conditionality, the terms on which it will lend,
has often required budgetary and domestic credit restraints, as well as trade liberaliza-
tion); WoRLD BANK, THE EAsT AsIAN MmAcLE EcONoMIc GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY 10
(1993) [hereinafter EAST AsIAN MmAcLrE] (advocating a "market friendly" strategy in
which "the appropriate role of government is to ensure adequate investments in people,
provide a competitive climate for private enterprise, keep the economy open to interna-
tional trade, and maintain a stable macroeconomy"); BArEND A. DE VRiaS, REMAKING THE
Womi) BANK 6, 56-58 (1987) (describing how the World Bank has encouraged decen-
tralized planning rather than command-type central planning, and has made substantial
loans to help borrowing nations increase their economies' efficiency and competitive-
ness, such as by liberalizing trade); cf. John Williamson, Introduction, in IMF CoNImo-
ALrrY, supra note 34, at xiii (stating that one complaint of borrowing countries is that the
IMF is "ideologically biased in favor of free markets and against socialism"). At this
time, however, the WTO is the most important of the international economic institutions
in carrying out the implementation of free market principles, primarily the idea of open-
ing markets (liberalizing trade) among countries. The WTO agreements have gone
beyond the GATT in covering trade in services as well as trade-related aspects of intellec-
tual property and trade-related investment measures. See General Agreement on Trade
in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation, Annex lB, 33 LLM. 44 (1994); Agreement on The Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 33 I.LM. 81 (1994);
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Agreements on Trade in Goods, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
available in <http://itl.irv.uit.no/tradejaw/documents/freetrade> (visited Mar. 29,
1997). Further, the WTO agreements address more meaningfully the subjects of agricul-
ture, textiles, and apparel. See Agreement on Agriculture, Agreements on Trade in
Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Annex IA, available in <http://itl.irv.uit.no/trade_law/documents/freetrade> (vis-
ited Mar. 29, 1997); Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Agreements on Trade in
Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Annex IA, available in <http://itLirv.uit.no/tradelaw/documents/freetrade> (vis-
ited Mar. 29, 1997).
56. For instance, the WTO makes a member's subsidy to its domestic industry
actionable by another member if its effect "is to displace or impede the imports of a like
product of another Member into the market of the subsidizing Member." Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Agreements on Trade in Goods, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, art. 6.3(a),
available in <http://itl.irv.uit.no/trade_law/documents/freetrade> (visited Mar. 29,
1997).
57. See supra note 50.
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increase global income.58
C. Political Globalization
As economic globalization expands, it has been accompanied by a some-
what lesser degree of political globalization in that there are now substan-
tial numbers of elected governments." Also, the rhetoric of human rights
has gained universal acceptance, and more nations than ever before have
pledged to protect human rights.60 With political globalization, there is
58. See WTO to Boost Global Income by $500 Billion, Focus (GATT Newsletter), Oct.
1994, at 1.
59. See, e.g., Judith Matloff, Democracy, of a Sort, Sweeps Africa, Ctsr. Sci. MoNI-
TOR, Aug. 7, 1996, at 10. The 1995-96 Freedom House survey observes that
The rise in the number of formal democracies continued in 1995. This year's
survey shows that there are now 117 democracies .... This represents just over
61 percent of the world's 191 countries. From the perspective of a decade ago
the gain is all the more impressive. Ten years ago, less than 42 percent of the
world's countries were formal democracies.
Today, 3.1 billion persons out of a world population of 5.7 billion live under
democratically elected governments. While not yet a universal standard, democ-
racy has deepening and widening roots in all parts of the world ....
That 61 percent of all countries and nearly 55 percent of the world's popula-
tion live under governments and legislatures elected in generally free and fair
political processes represents a landmark shift. Today it is the expectation of
the clear majority of citizens that their governments be accountable to them
through regular elections. Such a broadening global consciousness does not
guarantee full freedom, but it does create the basis for more free societies and
for greater engagement by citizens in public affairs. Widening public demo-
cratic consciousness throughout the world, as well as growing expectations by
the Western advanced industrial democracies that countries which receive sig-
nificant aid should respect fundamental human rights and democratic proce-
dures reinforces this trend.
Adrian Karatnycky, The Comparative Survey of Freedom 1995-1996: Democracy and Des-
potism: Bipolarism Renewed?, in FREEDoM iN THE WoRLD: THE ANNUAL SutvEy o PoLyr-
ICAL RIGHTS & CiviL LIBERTIEs 1995-1996, at 3, 4-5 (Roger Kaplan ed., 1996) [hereinafter
FREDoM IN Tm WoRuD 1995-96] (annual Freedom House survey).
60. At the second World Conference on Human Rights, all 171 participating states
adopted the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, which declared
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.
The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and
equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the
significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cul-
tural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States,
regardless of their political, economic, and cultural systems, to promote and pro-
tect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.
United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Pro-
gramme of Action art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24, pt. 1 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 1661, 1665
(1993). See generally HUMAN RIGHTs: AN AGENDA FOR THE Naxr CENrURY (Louis Henkin
& John L Hargrove eds., 1994) [hereinafter HUMAN RiGnrrs].
More countries have formally pledged to protect human rights. For example, there
have been numerous state parties to the following human rights instruments: Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 32 (122
parties); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 32
(135 parties); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 32 (135
parties); and International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, supra note 32 (148 parties). See Texts of the International Human Rights Instru-
ments (visited Dec. 11, 1996) <http://193.135.156.15/htrl/intlinst.htn> (U.N. human
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more than just the existence of elected governments and the recognition of
human rights by governments. Political globalization has also tended to
cause a convergence in political values, with the genuine acceptance of
democracy and human rights in a greater number of countries.
Compared to the convergence in economic values, the convergence of
political values has had a more difficult path. The growth of economic
globalization was championed by countries that realized they would gain
economically by increased foreign trade. Even the command-economy
communist nations sought trade with the capitalist economies of the
West.61 Well before the end of the Cold War, some communist nations
even embraced capitalism to an extent. As events in China have clearly
shown, dictatorship and a dismal human rights record have not been
incompatible with free market policies.62
Unlike economic globalization, the support for political globalization
historically has been weak, perhaps because its benefits were not as obvi-
ous or immediate. Despite their long history predating free market princi-
ples, the political values of democracy and human rights have been more
dishonored by breach than honored by observance.63 Most countries did
rights webpage containing links to the status of ratification of over 90 human rights
instruments) [hereinafter Human Rights Instruments]. "Parties" to a treaty (whether by
ratification, accession, etc.) are states that have "consented to be bound by the treaty
and for which the treaty is in force." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2,
para. (1)(g), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 at 289, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969). However,
since some of the parties are countries that lack democratic governments and have a
poor human rights record, it is dear that for these countries, the human rights instru-
ments have no real meaning. See, e.g., Human Rights Instruments, supra (Cambodia and
Rwanda are parties to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide; Iraq, to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
61. For example, from 1986 to 1988, the 12-nation European Community (now the
15-nation European Union, with Austria, Finland, and Sweden as new members)
imported 74.245 billion ECU ($85.4 billion) of goods from the 8-nation Soviet Bloc (the
USSR, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Alba-
nia), and exported 60.212 billion ECU ($69.2 billion). See OFFCE FOR OmCIAL PUBLICA-
TIONS OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMuNrrIEs, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND ITS EASTERN
NEIGHBOURS 11-13 (1990); EUROPEAN INv~srNr BANK, ANNUAL REPORT 1990, at 51
(1991) (extrapolating from graph an exchange rate of ECU 1.15 = $1). In 1995, Chi-
nese imports of goods to the United States totaled $45.542 billion, and U.S. exports to
China totaled $11.750 billion. See SURVEY OF CURRNm BUSINESS, July 1996, supra note
40, at 76 tbl. 2, 78 tbL 2. Obviously, since it takes two to trade, the desire of the commu-
nist nations to trade had to be matched by a corresponding desire on the part of the
West.
62. See, e.g., Survey of China: A Vacancy Awaits, ECONOMIST, Mar. 18, 1995, at survey
3-4; ORVILLE SCHm.L, MANDATE OF HEAvEN: A NEw GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISsi-
DENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CAIM TO CHmNA'S FUTURE 331-406 (1994);
NICHOLAS D. KRisTOF & SHERYL WuDUNN, CHINA WAKES: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF
A RISING PowER 308-69 (1994). See generally SUSUMU YABUia, CmNA'S NEw POLITICAL
ECONOMY: THE GIANT AwAK.s (Stephen M. Hamer trans., 1995).
63. International commerce and trade have been in existence for millennia. But the
intellectual foundations of capitalism are more recent. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY
INTO THE NATURE Am CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937);
SAMmSON & NoRDHAus, supra note 50, at 4. By contrast, the ideas of democracy and
notions analogous to some human rights were discussed long before. See, e.g., Ames.
TOTLE, THE PoITIcs 145-55, 159-64, 240-44 (trans. T. A. Sinclair, 1962) (defining and
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not espouse them, and those that did applied these concepts selectively. 64
For decades after the end of World War II, the spread of humanitarian
political values had to contend with severe obstacles.65 For much of the
classifying democracy); Weston, supra note 37, at 14-17 (tracing the origin of human
rights, known in earlier forms as "natural rights" or "the rights of Man," to ancient
Greece and Rome). This article uses the term "democracy" to mean a society that is
ruled indirectly by its citizens through their elected representatives. Such a democracy
does not always protect "human rights" because a tyranny of the majority may deny
human rights to a disfavored minority.
64. As many are undoubtedly aware, the United States, the world's leading symbol
for democracy and human rights, denied democratic representation and basic human
rights to African-Americans for at least a century before and a century after the United
States was born. Native Americans also suffered greatly.
65. Among them were anti-minority attitudes among majorities in democratic coun-
tries, entrenched authoritarian traditions in nondemocratic countries, the attempt of
colonial powers to retain their colonies, the indifference of the industrialized countries
to conditions in developing countries, internecine internal wars in nondemocratic coun-
tries, the subordination of political to economic values, and the Cold War. The compli-
cations of the Cold War and rampant colonialism almost immediately made the United
Nations-the institution designed to keep the peace and promote democracy and human
rights-ineffective in doing any of the three.
Since most of the founding members of the United Nations were participants in the
Allied cause which had fought against the Axis Powers, some common agreement on
U.N. purpose and action could have been expected. But soon after World War II ended,
the Cold War began, crippling the ability of the United Nations to act as an arbitrator or
enforcer of peace. See, e.g., RIGHTER, supra note 30, at 315. Perhaps even without the
Cold War, the United Nations would have been ineffective. It was incapable of handling
the new type of warfare that became dominant after World War II: "wars of liberation,
civil wars, transfrontier guerrilla operations, and even jihad." Id. Further, throughout
the Cold War, the promotion of democracy and human rights by the United States was
secondary in priority to American national security concerns. To contain communism,
the United States allied itself with dictatorships or nondemocracies in Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Indonesia, Portugal, South Africa, South Korea,
South Vietnam, Spain, Taiwan, and numerous other countries. See, e.g. TomJ. Farer, On
a Collision Course: The American Campaign for Human Rights and the Antiradical Bias in
the Third World, in HuMAN RIGHTS AND AMEmcA. FOREIGN Poucy 263 (Donald P. Kom-
mers and Gilburt D. Loescher eds., 1979).
In the following decades, the United Nations proved itself incapable either in prevent-
ing or in resolving, by diplomacy or military force, wars and internal conflicts-a number
involving wars of independence. Several conflicts grew out of wars of independence in
which colonized peoples sought to liberate themselves from European powers. Anti-
colonial revolts, some quite bloody, broke out all over the world, eventually leading to
independence for European colonies. See, e.g., RAYmoND K. KEN, FROM MADAGASCAR TO
THE MALAGASY REPuBLC (1962) (French Madagascar); DONALD L.ANcsrER, Tm EMANcIPA-
"ION OF FaN'cH INDOCHINA (1961) (French Indochina); MAHFOUD BENNoUNE, THE MAK-
ING OF CoNTEMPORARY ALGERI: 1830-1987 (1988) (French Algeria). For other new
nations, independence from colonial rule was considerably less violent. See, e.g., BRIAN
LAPPING, END OF EMPIRE (1985) (nations emerging from the dismantling of the British
Empire after World War II); FEDERAL RESEARCH DaIISION, LmARY oF CONGRESS, PinIu-
PINES: A CouNTRY S=rrY 38-39, 41-43 (Ronald E. Dolan ed., 4th ed. 1993) (indepen-
dence of the Philippines from America). When the United Nations was born in 1945,
about 750 million people, nearly a third of the world's population, lived in dependent
territories; today, about 1.5 million do. See Decolonization, U.N. CHRON., Sept. 1995, at
10.
While no single war of the magnitude of the World Wars occurred, numerous other
conflicts emerged, with lethal results. The list of wars, hostilities, conflicts, and suppres-
sions running from the late 1940s through the 1990s is long and depressing: e.g., the
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existence of the United Nations, the most important international organiza-
tion devoted to the promotion of democracy and human rights, many of its
leading members either did not observe democratic values or human rights
domestically, or subordinated these values to other priorities in foreign
affairs.66 Despite initial obstacles, however, these political values slowly
developed roots in non-western countries.
Even before the end of the Cold War, the past two decades saw the
emergence of a greater number of countries with democratic governments
and protective of human rights.67 These countries offer political rights and
Communist-Nationalist battle for China; the French Suppression in Madagascar, the
French Vietnam War;, the Chinese Suppression in Tibet; the Soviet Suppression in Hun-
gary; the Korean War;, the French Algerian War, the U.S. Vietnam War, the Soviet Sup-
pression in Czechoslovakia; the three Arab-Israeli Wars; the Cambodian Massacres; the
Soviet Afghanistan War, the Argentine-British Falklands War; the Iraq-Iran War; the Gulf
War, the Bosnian War, and the Rwandan Massacres. During its first four decades, "the
U.N. proved manifestly incapable of preventing close to 150 conflicts, including more
than 125 in the Third World, which cost some 22 million lives." RIGiHTR, supra note 30,
at 311.
The absence of major wars on the scale of World War 11 or World War I is attributable
not so much to U.N. influence, but to nuclear deterrence-the horrible prospect that
another such war would involve the massive use of nuclear weapons and cause the prob-
able destruction of human civilization. One relatively successful U.N. action to punish
aggression was the Persian Gulf War of 1991, in which U.N. forces, comprised primarily
of United States military personnel, defeated the Iraqi invaders who had conquered
Kuwait. See ANTHoNY C. AREND & ROBERT J. BEcK, INTERNATioNAL LAW AmD THE USE OF
FORCE BEYOND ThE UN CHaE PAPADIGM 53-55 (1993). In that conflict, American
leadership together with military assistance from U.S. European allies and political
acquiescence from China and Russia allowed the United Nations to take decisive action
against a belligerent nation. Even in that "success" story, the root cause of Iraqi aggres-
sion--Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein-was not removed; he continues to rule Iraq. The
U.N.-sanctioned invasion of Haiti by American troops might be considered another suc-
cessful action. See, e.g., UN Efforts Give "Exemplary Illustration of Diplomacy of Democ-
ratization," Says Secretary-General, U.N. CHRON., Spring 1996, at 4; Richard D. Lyons,
U.N. Authorizes Invasion of Haiti to Be Led by U.S., N.Y. TwMss, Aug. 1, 1994, at Al.
Even with colonialism long disappeared and the end of the Cold War, the United
Nations has difficulty dealing with conflicts involving civil wars, guerilla operations of
minority or occupied populations, and persecution of particular groups by government
authorities. See, e.g., RIGrrER, supra note 30, at 315. Many hostilities or acts of violence
were purely internal to a country, and thus, more difficult for the U.N. to intervene. See,
e.g., Michael R. Gordon, Chechnya Toll Is Far Higher, 80,000 Dead, Lebed Asserts, N.Y.
TmEs, Sept. 4, 1996, at A3 (Russian presidential security adviser Lebed estimating that,
to date, 80,000 people have been killed and 240,000 wounded in the fighting between
Chechen separatists and Russia troops in the Russian republic of Chechnya); Clestine
Bohlen, War on Rebel Kurds Puts Turkey's Ideals to Test, N.Y. TIEs, July 16, 1995, § 1, at
3 (Turkish government war against minority Kurds displacing over 300,000 villagers
from their homes and resulting in a death toll approaching 18,000).
66. For example, after World War II ended, France fought to keep her colonies from
becoming independent, and neither Communist China nor the Soviet Union placed
much value on human life. See, e.g., supra note 65 (postwar French colonialism); KIs-
TOF & WuDutN, supra note 62, at 65 (Chinese communist elimination of potential
counter revolutionaries); ROBERT CONQUEST, THE GREAT TEmoR: A REAssEsssmrr 477-78,
484-86 (1990) (citing millions imprisoned at Soviet labor camps in the 1950s).
67. See FREEDOM IN THE WoRm 1995-96, supra note 59, at 1. Given the disparity of
political freedoms and civil liberties between countries, only a rough assessment of the
number of countries with democratic governments and human rights is possible.
According to one estimate, at the beginning of 1996, 19.55% of the people in the world
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civil liberties that make them different in kind from past authoritarian
regimes. With the end of the Cold War, many of the former Soviet-allied
countries established popularly elected governments. Earlier, elected gov-
ernments emerged from dictatorships in Latin America, Asia, and Africa.68
As the transformation of South Africa-the former bastion of apartheid-
into a democratic country shows, the unbelievable can happen.
The outlook today is promising for the values of democracy and, to a
lesser extent, human rights. First, with the triumph of liberal democracy
over communism in the Cold War,69 the United States and its allies can
now more vigorously pursue humanitarian rather than security objectives.
Second, the commonality of democracy and human rights in nations has
provided more reason for these nations to cooperate among themselves in
trade, humanitarian, and security matters, as well as in trying to nurture
the qualities of democracy and human rights in authoritarian countries.
The remaining authoritarian strongholds face pressures to democratize,
and to recognize some level of human rights.70
Democracy has been easier to achieve than the protection of human
rights, perhaps because the implementation of democracy is technically
more easily accomplished (e.g., a popularly elected government), while
there may be disagreement over which rights are basic human rights and
how these basic rights are to be protected.71 Furthermore, elected govern-
ments need not necessarily protect human rights, especially in nascent
lived in free countries (i.e., with a "broad range of political rights and civil liberties"),
41.49% in pardy free countries (where some basic rights are denied), and 38.96% in
countries that were not free (basic rights are denied). See Karatnycky, supra note 59, at
4 (1995-96 Freedom House survey). The number of countries in each category in vari-
ous years were as follows:
FZE PAR=T FPur NOT F=
YEAR Co UNR S COVTNES CouLM-nES
1986 56 56 55
1993 75 73 38
1994 72 63 55
1995 76 61 54
1996 76 62 53
Id. at 8. Other sources also rate the political rights and civil liberties of individual coun-
tries. See, e.g. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HumN RIGHrs WATCH WoRLD REPORT 1996
(1995); CouNTRY REPORTS ON HUmAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1994, REPORT SUBMrEr TO
THE COMMIrEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS U.S. SENATE AND THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATrES BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 104th Cong.
(1995) [hereinafter HuMAN RIGrS PRAcncs 1994]. See generally Marcus W. Brauchli,
More Nations Embrace Democracy-and Find It Often Can Be Messy, WALL ST. J., June 25,
1996, at Al.
68. See Tina Rosenberg, Overcoming the Legacies of Dictatorship, FOREIGN AFF., May-
June 1995, at 134, 135.
69. This victory is attributable not just to the United States and its allies, but also to
the courage and vision of former communist leaders like Mikhail Gorbachev. See, e.g.,
infra note 134.
70. See STEPHAN HAGGARD & ROBERT R. KAUFMAN, THE PoLrIcAL ECONOMY OF DEMo-
CRATIC Ta~snmoNs 4 (1995).
71. For example, some Asian countries disagree with the West on the need fo1 exten-
sive human rights protection. See, e.g., Charles Graybow, South and East Asia: A Raw
Deal for the Masses, in FRmoM IN m WORLD 1995-96, supra note 59, at 68, 69-70.
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democracies which may have problems of illiteracy, corruption, authorita-
rian traditions, ethnic or religious conflicts, and a winner-takes-all political
system.72
The value of democratic governments is that their actions reflect the
desires of a majority of the people rather than the wishes of a tyrant or a
select few. Democracy is arguably the most basic human right because it
recognizes the sovereignty of the people in that a government pursues poli-
cies which the majority of the people support through their freely elected
representatives. The preferences of at least a majority of its population,
rather than the desires of a select few, influence democratic governments.
Democratic governments are much more likely to respect human rights, at
least those of the majority, than authoritarian regimes which are unac-
countable to an electorate. Of course, democracy is not itself a sufficient
condition for a humane society, since a majority may persecute or subju-
gate a minority in a democratic society.73 A practical benefit of mature
democracies, those having democratic governments for a long period of
time, is that they substantially protect a wide variety of human rights and
are much less likely to use military force to resolve conflicts.74
72. See, e.g., Matloff, supra note 59 (reporting on the fragility of African democra-
cies); Howard W. French, Can African Democracy Survive Ethnic Voting?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
17, 1996, § 4 at 4 (stating that voter allegiance to tribe, language, and region is stronger
than to policy throughout Africa because countries were artificially created by European
powers; democratic elections give winners everything and losers nothing). In its 1994-
95 survey, Freedom House reported:
Many of these democracies, however, remain fragile and often are incapable of
providing for the basic rights of their citizens ....
Many of these fragile democracies are at risk because of internal division,
rampant corruption, overarching influence by militaries and oligarchies, and
destabilization from abroad. As a result 37 democracies are only Partly Free.
Inter-ethnic and inter-sectarian strife is a major contributing factor in the ero-
sion of political rights and civil liberties in many formal democracies.
Adrian Karatnycky, The Comparative Survey of Freedom 1994-1995: Democracies on the
Rise, Democracies at Risk, in FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: THE ANNUAL SURvEY OF POLITICAL
RIGHTS & CIVIL LiBER-IEs 1994-1995, at 3, 4 (James Finn ed., 1995). As examples of
democracies at risk, Freedom House listed countries with inter-ethnic or inter-sectarian
conflict (e.g., Bosnia, India, Turkey, Mali, Niger); countries in transition from commu-
nist rule (e.g., Albania, Romania, Russia); countries recovering from extended periods of
guerrilla insurgencies, terrorism, and civil war (e.g., El Salvador, Nicaragua,
Mozambique); and countries where the political process and judicial system are tainted
by corruption, such as the influence of drug cartels (e.g., Brazil, Colombia, the Domini-
can Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, Venezuela). See id. at 4-5.
73. To take a historical example, the Confederate States of America was formed on
February 8, 1861, by seven states that seceded from the United States of America, and
eventually grew to consist of eleven seceding states. See SAMUEL E. MOIsON, THE
Ox oPD HISrORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 607-12, 625 (1965) (the eleven confederate
states were Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia). The confederacy was a democracy,
except that the human rights of a large minority were disregarded. In 1860, on the eve
of the Civil War, blacks-the great majority of whom were slaves-comprised 42% of the
population in the states that later became the Confederate States of America. Cf. His-
TORICAL STATITCS OF THE UNr= STATES, supra note 23, at 24 tbl. ser. A 195-209 (figure
of 42% derived from statistical data).
74. While mature and stable democracies are less likely to go to war, newly democ-
ratized countries in transition from authoritarian to democratic governments seem more
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Despite disagreement over the extent to which human rights should be
protected, some level of human rights protection exists for a substantial
percentage, if not the majority, of the world's population.75 For an increas-
ing number of countries, there seems to be a real, as opposed to a rhetori-
cal, acceptance of some form of human rights. While inadequate and
imperfect, this is an enormous improvement over the past. While outra-
geous examples of inhumanity still occur, such as in Rwanda, they are uni-
versally condemned.76
In an indirect way, the cultural impact of economic globalization stim-
ulates political globalization. Economic globalization has long introduced
aspects of foreign cultures-especially American culture-either directly by
the sale of merchandise such as movies and musical recordings, or indi-
rectly through exposure to foreigners. 77 More than in the past, the open-
ing of new markets through economic globalization has brought a flood of
people and companies into foreign lands.
Personal contact, always so important in understanding other human
beings, has made foreigners less inscrutable. More business personnel are
assigned to overseas offices, more consumers travel abroad as tourists, and
more students study in foreign countries. 78 Local residents are more likely
than ever before to work for, do business with, or personally know foreign-
ers. In some cases, this transnational encounter may lead to a personal
likely to fight wars than mature democracies or even autocracies. These newly democra-
tizing countries will fight wars even with democratic states. See Edward D. Mansfield &
Jack Snyder, Democratization and War, 74 FOREIGN Aix., May-June 1995, at 79. For
example, a combination of nationalism and incipient democratization led to the start of
disastrous wars in late 18th-century France, pre-World War I Germany, andJapan in the
1920s. Id. at 85-86.
75. There is not a "complete agreement about the nature of [human] rights or their
substantive scope-which is to say, their definition." Weston, supra note 37, at 17. Still,
it is clear that the protection of human rights is widespread. See supra note 67.
76. Unfortunately, this universal condemnation has not been matched by immediate
universal action to prevent the inhumanity. Because of this inaction, some have sug-
gested the creation of a standing emergency force under the United Nations which
would intervene to prevent lethal conflicts. See infra note 156.
77. See, e.g., John Yemma, The Americanization of the World, BosToN GLOBE, July 28,
1996, at Fl.
78. For example, international tourism receipts, excluding air travel, are estimated to
have been $372 billion in 1995 spent by 567 million tourists. See Ron Scherer, Tourism
Booms as World's Middle Class Goes Trekking, CHRIST. SC. MoNrroR, June 12, 1996, at 1
(citing figures from the World Tourism Organization). Eight of the top twenty destina-
tions for tourism in 1995 were countries that were part of the European Union, and
twelve were European countries:
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affinity with or an in-depth understanding of foreign cultures.79
TouRisr
ToP TwE..Z'- APjmvAs
Cou'nuFs iN 1995 (MILIONS)
1. France 60.6
2. Spain 45.1


















Id. Many tourists are likely to come from neighboring countries. For example, in 1994,
out of 46.4 million Americans traveling to foreign countries, 28.3 million went to Can-
ada or Mexico, while of 45.5 million foreigners traveling to the United States, 26.3 mil-
lion came from Canada or Mexico. See BuREAu OF THE CENsus, DEP'T oF COM.,
STATISTICAL ABsrmAcT OF Tm UN=E STATES 1995, at 266-67 tbls. 430-31 (115th ed.,
Sept. 1995)) (estimate) [hereinafter 1995 STATISTcAL ABsrRAcr]. As for business-related
travelers and students, in 1993 there were approximately 3.5 million nonimmigrants
admitted to the United States in connection with a business purpose: 2,962,000 busi-
ness travelers; 145,000 treaty traders and investors; 224,000 temporary workers and
trainees; 21,000 representatives of foreign information media; and 132,000 intracom-
pany transferees. See id. at 11 tbl. 7. In fall 1993, there were 449,000 foreign students
enrolled in U.S. colleges and universities. Id. at 188 tbl. 295.
79. Exposure to foreign businesses, tourists, and products is no guarantee that local
residents will achieve an in-depth understanding of a foreign culture. A particular for-
eign culture may be more difficult to understand if it is little studied by local residents
and has different historical roots from the local culture. For example, there are signifi-
cantJapanese investments, large numbers ofJapanese tourists and students, and a wide-
spread presence of Japanese consumer products in the United States. See, e.g., Alex Y.
Seita, The Intractable State of United States-Japan Relations, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
467, 469 & n.2, 479 & n.31 (1995); 1995 STATISTICAL ABSTRACr, supra note 78, at 188
tbL 295 (in 1994, Japanese students comprised the single largest group of foreign stu-
dents in the United States, with 44,000 out of a total of 449,000), 267 tbl. 432 (in 1993,
Japanese travelers constituted the single largest group of foreign visitors for pleasure
admitted to the United States, nearly 3.2 million out of a total of 16.9 million). Despite
that, most Americans are still not very familiar with Japanese culture. Japan is still
viewed by most Americans in stereotypical terms that may contain some truth but which
lack in-depth analysis based on objective data. See, e.g., Robert D. Deutsch & ArthurJ.
Alexander, Americans' Images ofJapan, JAPAN EcoN. INsr., May 17, 1996, No. 19A, at 1,
16. Nevertheless, American perceptions of Japan, as well as Japanese perceptions of
America, are undoubtedly more accurate and positive today than during World War II
and before. See, e.g., JOHN W. DOWER, WAR wrmour MERCY: RACE AND POWER IN THE
PACIFIC WA 15-32 (1986); SHEE.A K. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE THROUGH AMERICAN EYES 1-
17, 163-71 (1988).
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Further, economic globalization has generated an interest in learning
foreign languages, primarily English. Perhaps irreversibly, English has
become the international language of business and science, with a broader
usage than any other language.80 At the same time, the ability to speak a
foreign language other than English gives one a competitive advantage in
doing business in nonEnglish-speaking countries.8 '
Doing business with foreigners, in their country or in one's own,
requires that one communicate with them, cooperate with them, and be
exposed to their political and business values.8 2 The political values of
democracy and human rights, as well as aspects of foreign cultures, are
often inseparable (though secondary) components of economic globaliza-
tion. Thus, countries that seek to benefit from economic globalization
must frequently tolerate political globalization and exposure to foreign cul-
tures. As people know more about foreign cultures, some familiarity with
foreign political values is bound to arise.
II. Technology's Vital Role in Converging Values
The advanced communication technology that links much of the world
together continues to be crucial to the convergence of economic and polit-
ical values. This technology is utilized primarily by business entities to
facilitate economic globalization.8 3 Modern technology has also tended to
promote democracy and human rights by making it easier and cheaper for
80. Even though only 377 million people speak English as a first language, probably
1.8 billion people, one-third of the world's population, are regularly exposed to English
in their daily lives. By one estimate, a billion people will be speaking or learning English
by the year 2000. English is not only the language of business, but that of science as
well, with two-thirds of the world's scientists reading scientific information in English
and with four-fifths of all stored electronic information in English. See, e.g., William
McGurn, English in Asia: Money Talks, FAR EAsT. EcoN. Rav., Mar. 21, 1996, at 40; Alex-
ander MacLeod, Once-Fussy BBC Begins to Speak with Scottish, Irish, Even American
Accents, CHuusr. Sct. MoN-oR, Sept. 4, 1996, at 11; Kim Campbell, The World Rushes to
Speak and Write "American" English, CnRisr. Sci. MoNrroR, Sept. 4, 1996, at 10.
81. Being able to speak the language of the country that you wish to do business in
is an obvious advantage. See, e.g., Bernard Wysocki Jr., Utah's Economy Goes Global,
Thanks in Part to Role of Missionaries: Mormons' Overseas Stints Yield Linguistic Skills and
Network of Contacts, WAIL ST. J., Mar. 28, 1996, at Al. Understanding a country's lan-
guage means that one can read its newspapers, watch its television programs, and talk to
its ordinary citizens. It is an important way in which one understands and appreciates
another country's culture.
82. This might mean, for example, that a foreign-owned subsidiary in the United
States must adhere to American laws prohibiting sexual harassment. See, e.g., Leon
Jaroff, Assembly-Line Sexism?: Charges of Abusing Women-and Angry Denials-Rock a
Midwestern Mitsubishi Auto Plant, TIM-, Jan. 7, 1992, at 1 (Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission files the biggest federal sexual-harassment lawsuit in history against a
factory operated by the American subsidiary of a Japanese company); Mark Maremont,
Abuse of Power: The Astonishing Tale of Sexual Harassment at Astra USA, Bus. WK, May
13, 1996, at 86 (allegations of widespread sexual harassment at the American subsidiary
of a Swedish company). On the other hand, foreigners may apply their home country's
ethical code of conduct while doing business in another country. See infra note 168
(discussing foreign corrupt practices).
83. Technology is only a tool, deftly applied by the skilled and wasted by the incom-
petent. Since technology can provide tremendous advantages for conducting business,
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people to communicate without censorship across national boundaries.
Communication technology not only exposes a national population to for-
eign ideas, but also concurrently exposes domestic conditions to a global
audience.
This has occurred because economic globalization involves communi-
cation technologies with multiple uses. The same technology that trans-
mits a business proposal may also communicate politically embarrassing
or other non-business information. These multiple uses of advanced tech-
nology cannot easily be separated from each other, making it difficult to
restrict the technology to purely business purposes. A country that wishes
to participate in international business cannot isolate itself from all uses of
communication technologies unrelated to business dealings.84
The internet85 is a recent communication medium with tremendous
potential for linking people across national boundaries, furthering mutual
interests of the international community, and a myriad of other uses.8 6
The internet will become, or may already be, an important or even critical
technological medium for business, as well as for scientific research and
consumer enjoyment.8 7 The internet is the essential part of the "informa-
flexible and cost-efficient private firms--the basic actors in the free market-utilize tech-
nology as they do any other productive input.
84. For example, faxes expedite international business transactions by connecting
different countries through telephone lines. Exact copies of business documents that
would otherwise require delivery by overnight courier service can be faxed in a few min-
utes. Business people can also transmit computer files by connecting a modem to a
telephone line. Within minutes, a subsidiary can dispatch data across the world to a
parent company which may need the information to make a quick financial decision.
Political dissidents can use the same fax machines or computer modems to send pic-
tures, reports, and other information to supporters in foreign countries. See, e.g., Joyce
Barnathan et al., China: Is Prosperity Creating a Freer Society?, Bus. WK.,June 6, 1994, at
94.
85. See generally ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTRNET: UsE's GuIDE & CATALOG (Bruce C.
Klopfenstein adapt., 1996); It's Only Growing Pains: The Second Annual Roundtable on the
State of the Internet, IEEE SPECTRUM, Sept. 1996, at 46.
86. Children can come into contact with their peers from other countries. See, e.g.,
China, Japan Kids Link Via Net, JAPAN TimEs, June 10-16, 1996, at 15 (weekly edition)
(Chinese andJapanese elementary students communicating through the internet). Like-
minded political groups can exchange information and publicize news events. For
example, the internet has numerous human rights resources. See, e.g., Welcome to the
United Nations Human Rights Website (visited Dec. 11, 1996) <http://193.135.156.15/
welcome.htrn> (U.N. website containing information relating to human rights); AAAS
Directory of Human Rights Site on the Internet (visited Oct. 15, 1996) <http://
www.aaas.org/spp/dspp/shr/dhr.htm#general> (from website of the American Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Science, publisher of the journal Science, listing human
rights resources on the internet).
87. See, e.g., Annual Report on Information Technology: The Information Appliance,
Bus. WY., June 24, 1996, at 71 (articles discussing devices that will utilize the intemet);
John W. Verity, Invoice? What's an Invoice?: Electronic Commerce Will Soon Radically
Alter the Way Business Buys and Sells, Bus. WY., June 10, 1996, at 110 (predicting that
once necessary software and security measures are in place, the internet's world wide
web will become the global infrastructure for electronic commerce); Joan O'C. Hamilton
& Heidi Dawley, Welcome to the World Wide Lab: By Providing Instant Access to Data, the
Web Is Changing How Research Is Done and Shared, Bus. WK., Oct. 30, 1995, at 66. There
are many publications that explain the functions, benefits, and methods of access to the
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tion superhighway," a source of information that promises to change fun-
damentally human lives.88
E-mail and computer file transmission on the internet can potentially
provide a more powerful (e.g., faster, cheaper, more convenient) business
tool than such conventional devices as the postal service, telephones, and
faxes. Internet users can transmit and download data, articles, images,
movies, speeches, sound recordings, and other information.8 9 By provid-
ing a forum for the transfer of such information, the internet will help pro-
tect the freedoms of expression and choice for followers of any ideological
persuasion.90 Unfortunately, however, it may shield criminal, obscene,
internet, including its most powerful and commercially attractive feature-the world
wide web. See, e.g., KROL, supra note 85; PC MAG., Oct. 10, 1995 (issue focusing on the
world wide web).
88. See, e.g., GENERAL AccoumING OmcE, INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY- AN OvER-
VIEWV OF TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES (GAO/AIMD-95-23, Jan. 1995); GENERAL AccouNING
OFFcE, INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY. ISSUES AFFECrING DEvELoPMENT (GAO/RCED-94-
285, Sept. 1994). The United States government
envisions the superhighway as a seamless web of communications networks,
computers, databases, and consumer electronics-built, owned, and operated
principally by the private section-that will put vast amounts of information at
users' fingertips. It believes that the superhighway, if freed from the constraints
imposed by rigid regulatory regimes, can fundamentally change the way we
work, learn, get health care and public services, shop, communicate, and enter-
tain ourselves.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY: AN OvERVIEw OF TEcHNOL-
OGY CHALLENGES, supra, at 2.
89. Today, the internet is generally not able to transmit data-intensive information
(e.g., movies) in real time (i.e., sending a two-hour movie on the internet will take much
longer than two hours). In the future, the internet will be able to transmit real-time, full-
motion video images along with audio signals that will allow, for instance, the kind of
teleconferencing that now occurs through satellite transmission. See, e.g., Laurent Bel-
sie, Promise from Cable Guys: Internet 300 Times Faster, CHuST. Sci. MoNroR, June 28,
1996, at 8 (stating that future home modems will transmit at speeds of 7 to 10 megabits
per second, much faster than the 28.8 kilobit modems commonly used by consumers
today). See generally Jan Ozer, Sound Blasts the Web, PC MAG., Mar. 26, 1996, at 103
(discussing the transmission of sound, whether speech or music, as an example of mul-
timedia on the internet's world wide web); Jan Ozer, Web TV Tunes in, PC MAG., Mar. 26,
1996, at 129 (discussing the transmission of video, or moving images, as an example of
multimedia on the internet's world wide web).
90. The ideology need not be political. Websites, the most popular and most power-
ful method of transmitting data on the internet, span the gamut of human interests and
cater to a myriad of tastes. See, e.g., Star Trek (visited Dec. 8, 1996) <http://star-
trek.msn.com> (website for news about various Star Trek productions); Welcome to the
White House (visited Dec. 8, 1996) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/Welcome.html>
(website to the White House); NCR Homepage (visited Dec. 8, 1996) <http://
www.nas.edu> (website for the National Research Council, which is administered by the
National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of
Medicine); Institute for Christian Leadership (visited Dec. 8, 1996) <http://
www.iclnet.org> (a religious website); Sydney 2000 (visited Dec. 8, 1996) <http://
www.sydney.olympic.org/> (website for the 2000 summer Olympic games in Sydney,
Australia); Albany Law School of Union University Homepage (visited Dec. 8, 1996)
<http://www.als.edu> (website for Albany Law School). Thus, huge amounts of infor-
mation are available to those who wish to receive or transmit information of any kind.
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racist, and terrorist activities as well. 9 1
A government might attempt to control the content of information
transfers. It could screen large numbers of telephone calls, faxes, or com-
puter data; it could restrict access to or intercept messages on the internet.
Total censorship, however, would bring a halt to international business.
9 2
Firms might object if government surveillance is too pervasive. For exam-
pie, companies might not want government officials to be privy to proprie-
tary information.93 A certain amount of freedom of communication is
therefore assured if a country wishes to be part of a global economy: inter-
national firms will leave a nation if censorship prohibitively increases the
cost of doing business. This will remain true even if governments attempt
to censor communications using the most advanced and cost-effective sur-
veillance technology available.94
91. See, e.g., World Wide Sex Links (visited Dec. 8, 1996) <http://web.demon.co.uk/
photouk/www/links.hnl> (website providing links, or connections, to sex-oriented
websites); Club Red Light District (visited Dec. 8, 1996) <http://fun2.fun.nl> (a sex-ori-
ented website); Anarchy N Explosives (visited Aug. 8, 1996) <http://www.netcore.ca/
-locutus/ane/ane.htn> (website giving recipes for making explosives); The World Wide
Anarchy Page (visited Aug. 8, 1996) <http://www.break.com.au/-dah/anarmain.html>
(same); Explosive Solutions (visited Feb. 22, 1997) <http://www.dra.nl/-funny/ter-
rorin.html> (same). These websites are easily located through world wide web search
engines which can be used without charge and which search for any type of website.
See, e.g., All-in-One Search Page (visited Dec. 8, 1996) <http://www.albany.net/allinone>
(website listing numerous search engines); AltaVista: Main Page (visited Dec. 8, 1996)
<http://www.altavista.digitaLcom> (search engine provided by the Digital Equipment
Corporation).
92. Perhaps, for example, international phone calls might be routed through a
switchboard where an operator would inquire about the purpose of the call and retain a
record of the parties to the telephone conversation. Copies of faxes might have to be
transmitted to the government. A government could restrict internet access to registered
users who claim to have only business objectives in utilizing the internet. At some point,
however, surveillance would become very cumbersome. Imagine, for instance, screening
millions of international calls a day.
93. Proprietary information, such as trade secrets, can be immensely valuable to a
company. For example, when the Indian government required the Coca Cola Company
to disclose the ingredients for its cola soft drink in order to establish a production sub-
sidiary in India, the Coca Cola Company chose not to invest in India. See Michael A.
Epstein, If It's the Real Thing, Guard It Carefully: How Companies Can Protect Trade
Secrets, N.Y.LJ. Nov. 22, 1993, at S1 (special section on intellectual property).
94. The Chinese government, for example, is attempting to control the political con-
tent of information on the internet in China. All 50,000 domestic internet users in
China are required to register with the police and are prohibited from hindering public
order. See Sheila Tefft, China Attempts to Have Its Net and Censor It Too, CHRIST. SCi.
MoNrroa, Aug. 5, 1996, at 1. Complete censorship, however, would seem to be impossi-
ble, especially if the number of users grow to the extent present in the West. Even the
most advanced western technology seems incapable of censoring the internet. See, e.g.
John Markoff, Japanese Chips May Scramble U.S. Export Ban, N.Y. TIMEs,June 4, 1996, at
Dl (reporting that Nippon Telegraph and Telephone, one ofJapan's largest corporations,
has been selling data scrambling chips that make it difficult, if not currently impossible,
for American intelligence and law enforcement agencies to conduct electronic surveil-
lance on telephone lines and the internet). See generally Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptog-
raphy: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C (2d ed. 1996) (discussing how
encryption maintains the secrecy of electronic messages; a sample source code for
encryption is included); PHILIP R, ZnmuwAN, THE OmncLi. PGP Usa's GumE (1995)
(discussing "Pretty Good Privacy," a widely used encryption for e-mail).
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Communication technologies not essential to international business
transactions also serve to bolster humanitarian political values. Interna-
tional news reporting utilizes communication technologies to broadcast
major domestic events of all types on a worldwide screen. There are
numerous journalists, broadcasters, and commentators whose professional
livelihood depends upon bringing newsworthy stories to a foreign, if not
international, audience. While most publicized stories may not involve
political events, many do. The competitive members of the news media are
unlikely to let stories of outrageous acts completely escape the attention of
the international public. Furthermore, these news articles may be read by
anyone in the world who has access to the internet.9 5
At the same time, news stories alone would not generate international
repercussions against repressive governments if purely theoretical political
values were involved. There must be influential constituencies that place
high priority on the existence of democracy and human rights, that seek to
spread those values, and that are galvanized into action upon news of
deplorable political conditions. Neither value would flourish unless there
were constituencies, either domestic or abroad, that strongly supported it.
The presence of democratic governments and strong protections for
human rights in the industrialized countries means that these values are
expressed to some degree in their business transactions with other coun-
tries.96 Sizable populations in the industrialized countries also attempt to
support democracy and human rights abroad through private means.97
Moreover, as the living standards of developing countries improve, the citi-
zenry of these countries seem to expect more democratization (first) and
95. For example, each day's edition of the New York Times can be read at the New
York Times website-currently, without charge. See The New York Times on the Web (vis-
ited Dec. 8, 1996) <http://www.nytimes.com>. Scientific and medical information is
also available on the web, sometimes free of charge and in full text (picture, charts,
tables, and other graphics are usually not available). See, e.g., Scientific America (visited
Dec. 8, 1996) <http://www.sciam.com> (free access to the current issue of Scientific
American); cf. Science On-Line (visited Dec. 8, 1996) <http://science-mag.aaas.org/sci-
ence> (free access to abstracts of current and some past issues of Science, published by
the American Association for the Advancement of Science); AMA Home Page (visited
Dec. 8, 1996) <http://www.ama-assrLorg> (free access to abstracts of current and some
past issues of journals published by the American Medical Association); New England
Journal of Medicine On-Line-Home Page (visited Dec. 8, 1996) <http://www.nejm.org>
(free access to abstracts of current and some past issues of the New England Journal of
Medicine). While this primarily facilitates scientific and medical research, it can also
publicize embarrassing information about the state of science and level of health in a
country. See, e.g., infra note 167.
96. See, e.g., infra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing reform of foreign
corrupt business practices).
97. For example, non-governmental organizations such as Human Rights Watch,
Amnesty International, and international labor unions are supported by private contri-
butions. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch (visited Oct. 15, 1996) <http://www.hrw.org>
(Human Rights Watch accepts contributions from private individuals and foundations
worldwide, and not from any government, directly or indirectly); cf. Introduction to
GreenPeace (visited Oct. 15, 1996) <http://www.greenpeace.org:80/gpi.html> (Green-
Peace, an environmental protection organization, is supported "by small contributions
from 5 million supporters in 158 countries and by sales of merchandise.").
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human rights (later).98
III. The Importance of Globalization
Because globalization promotes common values across nations and can
make foreign problems, conditions, issues, and debates as vivid and capti-
vating as national, state, and local ones, it contributes to a sense of world
community.99 It develops a feeling of empathy for the conditions of people
abroad, enlarging the group of human beings that an individual will iden-
tify with. Globalization thus helps to bring alive persons in foreign lands,
making them fellow human beings who simply live in different parts of the
world rather than abstract statistics of deaths, poverty, and suffering.
The convergence of basic political and economic values is thus funda-
mentally important because it helps to establish a common bond among
people in different countries, facilitating understanding and encouraging
cooperation. All other things being equal, the commonality among coun-
tries-whether in the form of basic values, culture, or language-enhances
their attractiveness to each other. 100 In addition, convergence increases
98. The high living standards of the industrialized West as well as the improving
standards of many developing countries have tended to reinforce the viability of democ-
racy and human rights. For both industrialized countries and newly industrializing
countries, this may be a reflection of the belief that altruistic desires can be pursued
only after the satisfication of basic needs. See generally ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, MonvA.
mON AND PERSoNArY (2d ed. 1970).
99. Recall, for example, CNN's broadcast of the single man who stood in the path of
a line of tanks and stopped their movement in Tiananmen Square. See Thomas Collins,
Footage Worthy of a Time Capsule, NEwsDAY, June 7, 1989, at 71, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Arcnws File.
100. For example, Americans have found investment in Western Europe more attrac-
tive than in other regions of the world, and in the United Kingdom more than in other
European countries. By historical cost, the U.S. direct investment position abroad in
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the possibility that a transformation of attitude will take place for those
who participate in transnational activities.
People will begin to regard foreigners in distant lands with the same
concern that they have for their fellow citizens.10 1 They will endeavor to
help these foreigners obtain basic political rights even though the status of
political rights in other countries will have no tangible beneficial impact at
home. 10 2 Convergence does not mean that there is a single model of a
market economy, a single type of democracy, or a single platform of
human rights. They exist in different forms, and nations may have differ-












See SURVEY OF CuRRENr BusiwEss, July 1996, supra note 40, at 47 tbl. 3. More than half of
all U.S. investment is in countries with a European culture (Hong Kong and Bermuda
are British colonies). Of the twenty countries in which U.S. direct investment is the
highest, fourteen have a European culture. Further, six (including Ireland) have a Brit-
ish cultural heritage and are largely English-speaking. The United Kingdom and Canada
are by far the largest recipients of U.S. direct investment. To some extent, the attractive-
ness of Europe, the United Kingdom, and Canada lies in the common heritage that they
have with America. The proximity of Canada and the relatively high standard of living
in all three are other factors.
101. It is evident for many that the lives of foreigners lack the same importance as
that of one's countrymen. See, e.g., Bush and Schwartzkopf Oppose Haiti Invasion, CHL
TRn., Sept. 16, 1994, at C1 (retired General Norman Schwartzkopf saying that "I don't
know of one thing in Haiti that's worth the life of a single American service man or
woman").
102. There is little need to promote basic economic rights (in the sense of free market
rights) in other countries; even Cuba has instituted market reforms. See FREEDoM IN THE
WoRaD 1995-96, supra note 59, at 199, 292.
103. Cf. HAGGARD & KAuYmAN, supra note 70, at 377-79 (but also noting that a multi-
plicity of factors could prevent the transition to democracy). There are some commenta-
tors who think that democracy exists only in one very specific form and that it protects
only particular human rights; any country that deviates from such standards is therefore
undemocratic and lacks human rights. See, e.g., PETERJ. HERZOG, JAPAN'S PsEuro-Dmoc-
RACY (1993) (arguing thatJapan is not a true democracy and does not adequately protect
human rights); ROBERT HARVEY, THE UNDEFEATED: THE RISE, FALL AND RISE OF GREATER
JAPAN 208-26 (1994) (same). This view is much too narrow. In different countries with
different cultures and traditions, some variation should be expected in the operation of
democracy and the protection of human rights. See, e.g., JOSHUA MUlAVCHIK, EXPORTING
DarOcRACY: FuLFaI.NG AmmcA's DEsrmY 91-108 (1991) (stating that Japan must be
considered democratic by any realistic standard). In the case of Japan, for example,
"[d]emocracy injapan is no less genuine for having acquired a peculiarly Japanese char-
acter than for having been initiated by Americans." Id. at 107. Some say that because of
its hierarchies and other idiosyncrasies, Japan's system is not a democracy at all. The
effective answer was reached some forty years ago:
Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 30
A. The Perspective of One Human Race
The convergence of fundamental values through globalization has
profound consequences because it increases the chance that a new per-
spective will develop, one which views membership in the human race as
the most significant societal relationship, except for nationality. 10 4 A per-
son owes his or her strongest collective loyalties to the various societies
with which he or she most intensely identifies. Today, this societal identifi-
cation can be based on numerous factors, including nationality, race, reli-
gion, and ethnic group. 10 5 While it is unlikely that nationality will be
surpassed as the most significant societal relationship, globalization and
the convergence of values may eventually convince people in different
countries that the second most important social group is the human race,
and not a person's racial, religious, or ethnic group.' 0 6
One of the first steps in the formation of a society is the recognition by
prospective members that they have common interests and bonds. An
essential commonality is that they share some fundamental values. A sec-
ond is that they identify themselves as members belonging to the same
community on the basis of a number of common ties, including shared
fundamental values. A third commonality is the universality of rights-the
active application of the "golden rule"-by which members expect that all
must be entitled to the same rights as well as charged with the same
responsibilities to ensure that these rights are protected.
Globalization promotes these three types of commonalities. Global-
ization establishes common ground by facilitating the almost universal
acceptance of market economies, the widespread emergence of democratic
governments, and the extensive approval of human rights. The most visible
example is economic. With the end of the Cold War, the free market econ-
omy has clearly triumphed over the command economy in the battle of the
The sovereignty of the people, the supremacy of law, the absolute guarantee of
basic rights and liberties, the independence of the courts, the recognition of the
individual-these must of necessity be the fundamental requirements. Through
what machinery they are provided, how they are to be obtained and assured,
presents a problem the solution of which may differ widely among men.
Id. (quoting General MacArthur, from SUPRENE COMMAND FOR THE ALLIED PowEas,
PoLmc.AL REORIENTATION OF JAPAN, p. 92).
104. On an individual level, family, personal, and work ties will ordinarily dominate a
person's life.
105. Ordinarily, the identification would occur on the basis of factors such as geogra-
phy, history, ethnicity, race, religion, and culture. Other possibilities might be political
creed, gender, or sexual orientation. These factors could be reduced to a yet more local
level-for example, a particular region, tribe, or sect. Individuals could simultaneously
view themselves as belonging to more than one society, identifying more strongly with
some than others.
106. In some cases, nationality may be subsumed by a regional identification. Per-
haps the identify of being a "European" will replace that of the individual nationalities of
the European Union. Whether a nationality or regional identification is involved, its
paramount importance will not change. Americans are, for instance, still likely to see
themselves first as Americans. A closer identification with the human race, however,
may mean that Americans will more quickly and vigorously respond to solve interna-
tional problems that involve human beings who are not Americans.
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economic paradigms. Because some variant of a market economy has
taken root in virtually all countries, there has been a convergence of sorts
in economic systems.107
Further, because it often requires exposure to and pervasive interac-
tion with foreigners-many of whom share the same fundamental values-
globalization can enlarge the group that one normally identifies with.
Globalization makes many of its participants empathize with the condi-
tions and problems of people who in earlier years would have been ignored
as unknown residents of remote locations. This empathy often leads to
sympathy and support when these people suffer unfairly.
Finally, the combination of shared values and identification produce
the third commonality, universality of rights.' 0 8 Citizens of one country
will often expect, and work actively to achieve, the same basic values in
other countries. They will treat nationals of other nations as they would
wish to be treated. The effects of shared values, identification, and univer-
sality of rights in globalization could have a pivotal long-term effect-the
possibility that a majority of human beings will begin to believe that they
are truly part of a single global society-the human race.
This is not to say that people disbelieve the idea that the human race
encompasses all human beings. Of course, they realize that there is only
one human species. Rather, the human race does not usually rank high on
the hierarchy of societies for most people. Smaller societies, especially
those based on nationality, race, religion, or ethnicity, command more loy-
alty. 1°9 The idea of the human race, the broadest and all-inclusive category
of the human species, is abstract and has little, if any, impact on the lives of
human beings. To believe in the. singular importance of the human race
requires an attitudinal shift in which a person views the human race
seriously.
107. Given the free market outlook of the major economic powers and international
economic organizations, a reversal in the ascendant position of the general free market
model is unlikely to occur in the near future. What will now occur is the fine tuning of
the free market model primarily through the World Trade Organization, bilateral agree-
ments, and increased regional integration. Policies of the International Monetary Fund,
World Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and other
international institutions will also be influential. There is already a vigorous debate over
the benefits of industrial policy in market economies. See, e.g., Seita, supra note 35, at
223-28 & nn.149-69 and sources cited therein (discussing Japan's industrial policy).
See generally EAsT AsLAN MmAcL, supra note 55 (discussing factors, including govern-
ment policies, that have contributed to the high economic growth rates of East Asian
market economies).
108. This is necessary because common values and identification alone are insuffi-
cient in themselves to create the attitude that membership in the human race is a
profound social relationship. Just sharing fundamental values with the people of other
countries and empathizing with them may only mean that one will feel regret but do
nothing when these people are deprived of the rights that flow from those values. If a
society is of essential importance to its members, they will work to protect it and their
fellow members.
109. Sometimes these societies almost totally overlap. See Seita, supra note 79, at 492
n.72 (listing countries, such as South Korea andJapan, where there is a nearly complete
overlap of nationality and ethnicity).
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This may occur because the convergence of values does not only mean
that the people of different countries will share the same basic values. It
may also lead to the greater promotion of these values for the people of
other countries. Historically and certainly today, America and the other
industrial democracies have attempted to foster democracy and human
rights in other countries. 110 While some part of this effort has been attrib-
utable to "self interest," it has also been due to the empathy that the indus-
trialized democracies have had for other countries."' The magnitude of
these efforts in the future, as in the past, will depend not solely upon the
available financial and human resources of the industrialized democracies.
It will also depend upon their national will-a factor undoubtedly influ-
enced by the intensity with which the people of the industrialized democra-
cies identify with people in foreign lands.
The perspective that the human race matters more than its component
divisions would accelerate cooperative efforts among nations to attack
global problems that adversely affect human rights and the quality of
human life. 112 Obviously, there is no shortage of such problems. Great
suffering still occurs in so many parts of the world, not just from internal
armed conflicts,113 but also from conditions of poverty.114 There are
severe health problems in much of the world which can be mitigated with
relatively little cost.115 There are the lives lost to the AIDS epidemic, and
110. See Karatnycky, supra note 59, at 6 (industrialized democracies increasingly
insistent that foreign aid recipients respect democracy and human rights); JPN ODA
Program (visited Oct. 15, 1996) <http://infomofa.nttls.co.jp/infomofa/refer/
jpnoda.html> (from website of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (One of the four
principles Japan follows in providing foreign aid-official development assistance-is
that "Full attention should be paid to efforts for promoting democratization and intro-
duction of a market-oriented economy, and the situation regarding the securing of basic
human rights and freedoms in the recipient country.").
111. See MuaRvctim, supra note 103, at 8-9.
112. See generally supra note 37 (giving examples of human rights).
113. See, e.g., Bill Berkeley, The Longest War in the World, N.Y. TimEs, Mar. 3, 1996, § 6
(magazine) at 59 (reporting on the civil war in Sudan that has occupied 30 of the last 40
years and 13 of the past 17 decades, and that has probably killed 1.5 million people
since 1983).
114. There is a problem of growing economic disparity among nations. The world is
being divided into rich and poor nations, with the gap between the two groups widen-
ing. See, e.g., ZAVEN N. DAVIDIAN, ECONOMIC DisPARrrms AMONG NATIONS: A THREAT TO
SURVIVAL IN A GLOBALIZED WORu.D (1994). Further, among developing countries, while
many of the nations of East Asia have enjoyed high rates of economic growth, other
countries, especially in Africa, have generally had much lower growth rates. See WORLD
ECONOMIC Oumooic, supra note 25, at 173-76; EAst AsLAN MIRACLE, supra note 55, at 1-3.
115. See, e.g., Warren E. Leary, Billions Suffering Needlessly, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES,
May 2, 1995, at C5 (citing the first annual survey of global health conducted by the
World Health Organization); Patrick E. Tyler, China Confronts Retardation of Millions
Deficient in Iodine, N.Y. Tmms, June 4, 1996, at Al (reporting that the Chinese Public
Health Ministry estimates that iodine deficiency during brain development has resulted
in over ten million cases of mental retardation in China). Poverty, and its companion,
malnutrition, take an especially heavy toll among children. See, e.g., J. Larry Brown &
Ernesto Pollitt, Malnutrition, Poverty and Intellectual Development, ScI. AM., Feb. 1996, at
38.
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the deaths and disabilities caused by land mines.116 Russia, a nuclear
superpower that could end life on this planet, has severe social, economic,
and political problems. 117 Making the human race important would not
just promote liberal democratic values but would also reduce human suf-
fering and perhaps eliminate completely the risk of nuclear war.
B. General Convergence of Values
Assuming that the formation of a single human society is a possible out-
come, two broad questions should be answered: what kind of human soci-
ety is being created, and is this society desirable. The answer to the latter
question will depend on an evaluator's subjective judgment of the society
that is being formed. Undoubtedly, the great majority of human beings
would abhor a world society that was being created by the conquests of a
totalitarian government. Presumably, most Americans (and many citizens
of other countries) would reject even a benevolent, democratic global soci-
ety in which a world government dominated by other countries dictated
laws that governed the lives of all human beings. If either outcome were
present, many would call for a halt to globalization. Thus the direction
that globalization follows is critical for assessing its appeal.
What globalization has brought is a general convergence of fundamen-
tal economic and political systems among many nations. These systems
are not identical. There are still innumerable differences among countries
with market economies, democratic governments, and respectful of human
rights. 118 The practices of one country may be intolerable to another coun-
116. SeeJohn C. Caldwell & Pat Caldwell, The African AIDS Epidemic, ScT. AM., Mar.
1996, at 62 (discussing the cause of the epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa); Gordon Fair-
dough, A Gathering Storm, FAR EAsT. ECON. REv., Sept. 21, 1995, at 26 (reporting on
AIDS in Thailand and other Asian countries); Gino Strada, The Horror of Land Mines,
Sci. Am., May 1996, at 40 (reporting that for the past two decades, antipersonnel land
mines have killed or maimed about 15,000 people a year worldwide, primarily civilians
and many of them children; that there are an estimated 100 million land mines planted
in 64 countries; and that many of these mines have lifespans of hundreds of years);
Kevin Fedarko, Land Mines: Cheap, Deadly and Cruel, Tmm, May 13, 1996, at 54.
117. The Russian life expectancy for men has declined dramatically and the inci-
dence of alcoholism among Russians has soared. See Michael Ryan, Alcoholism and Ris-
ing Mortality in the Russian Federation, Bmn. MED. J., Mar. 11, 1995, at 646 (reporting a
Russian male life expectancy of 59 years in 1993 compared with 64.9 in 1987). In some
ways, the state of medical services in Russia resembles that of developing nations which
cannot afford to treat preventable afflictions. For example, the lack of sophisticated
medical technology has given Russia a high rate of deafness among its population. See
Genine Babakian, The Silent Minority, Moscow TimEs, Feb. 24, 1996, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File (official statistics listing 12 million deaf people out of a
population of 150 million, with deafness caused in many by the administration of exces-
sive amounts of ototoxic antibiotics).
118. Corruption, for example, is much more common in certain new democracies
than others. See Matt Moffett &Jonathan Friedland, A New Latin America Faces a Devil
of Old: Rampant Corruption, WAnl ST. J., July 1, 1996, at Al (concluding that the
appearance of free markets and democracy in a number of Latin American countries has
not removed the prevalence of corruption and has merely changed the corrupt players
from bureaucrats and military dictators to entrepreneurs and politicians).
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try.'1 9 Furthermore, it is unlikely and probably undesirable that economic
and political systems will ever exactly converge. Nor is it foreseeable that
the nations of the world will coalesce into one.
Even among the industrialized democracies, there are enough dissimi-
larities in market economies, democratic governments, and attitudes
towards human rights that make some believe that the differences between
these nations outweigh the similarities. For example, Japan is frequently
characterized as having a producer-oriented market economy, as compared
with the consumer-oriented market economy of the United States.120 In
general, the members of the European Union more extensively regulate
their economies than the United States, engaging at times in social engi-
neering that seems contrary to market principles as interpreted by Ameri-
cans.121 In the area of criminal justice, the United States is virtually alone
in permitting the death penalty and imprisons a much higher percentage
119. For example, while Singapore has a free market economy and is a parliamentary
republic, certain drug offenses receive a mandatory death penalty, criminals can be
beaten with canes, and political censorship is practiced by the government. See FRmDOM
IN THE WORLD 1995-96, supra note 59, at 416-18; HUMAN RIGHrs PRACTICES 1994, supra
note 67, at 679-86; see also Henry Kamm, In Prosperous Singapore, Even the Elite Are
Nervous About Speaking Out, N.Y. TimEs, Aug. 13, 1995, at 10. An environment like
Singapore's would probably be unacceptable to most Americans.
120. See, e.g., Seita, supra note 107, at 198-99 & nn.21-25 and sources cited therein.
Japan is not the only industrialized country to differ significantly from the United States
in economic practices. For example, according to a U.S. government report, "[t]he fun-
damental way in which business operates differs in the United States, Japan, and Ger-
many." UNITED STATES GENERAL Accotn'G OFFICE, COMPETITIVENESS ISSUES: THE
BusIN-ss ENVIRONMENT IN Tm UNrTE STATES, JAPAN, AND GMANY 6 (GAO/GGD-93-124,
Aug. 1993).
121. For example, the European Union follows the legal rule of comparable worth,
that persons performing work of equal value should be paid the same, which is contrary
to the American rule of equal pay for equal work. Works of equal value are job perform-
ances that are deemed to be the same in "value" even though the jobs might be different
(e.g., the job of a secretary might be deemed to be the same in value as the job of a truck
driver). See Case 61/81, Commission v. U.K., 1982 E.C.R. 2601 (the European Court of
Justice holding that Great Britain had failed to implement Directive 75/117 which pro-
vided for equal pay for work of equal value); Eva_.YN ELLIS, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SEx
EQUALITY LAW 95-116 (1991) (discussing the Equal Pay Directive which implements the
doctrine of comparable worth in the European Union); ELAINE SoRENsEN, COMPARABLE
WORTH: IS IT A WORTHY POuCY? 3-19 (1994) (discussing the relative weakness of the
doctrine in the United States). Health insurance is more universal in EU countries (and
other industrialized democracies like Japan) than in the United States. See LAURENE A.
GRAIG, HEALTH OF NATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPEcnvE ON U.S. HEALTH CARE REFORM
(1991) (comparing universal health care in Canada, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands,
and Great Britain with the lack of universal health care in the United States); see also
Craig R. Whitney, Rising Health Costs Threaten Generous Benefits in Europe, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 1996, at Al. In many EU countries, the social safety net gives significantly
greater benefits than in the United States. See, e.g., Rebecca Blank, Does a Larger Social
Safety Net Mean Less Economic Flexibility?, in WORKING UNDER DIFEREN'r RULaS 157
(Richard B. Freeman ed., 1994); c. Nicholas D. Kristof, Welfare as Japan Knows It: A
Family Affair, N.Y. TimEs, Aug. 10, 1996, at Al (the qualifications for and attitudes about
welfare in Japan have historically been significantly different from those in the United
States; very few people qualify for welfare in Japan).
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of its population than other industrialized democracies. 122
Nonetheless, the basic economic and political systems of different
countries dearly share more similarities than ever before. When asked to
characterize their existing economic and political systems, more people in
more countries than ever before will respond that they have a "market"
economy, that their government is "democratic," and that they protect
"human rights." Importantly, the convergence of values seems to be accom-
panying the convergence of systems. Certainly, most people in the industri-
alized democracies would view their existing economic and political
systems as expressing the foundational values of their societies-the values
that define their society.123 The convergence of values along liberal demo-
122. Except for Japan (which executes a few criminals annually), no other industrial-
ized democracy inflicts the death penalty. See Teruaki Ueno, Japan Hangs Three Death-
Row Convicts, REUTERS, July 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curmws File;
Belgium Abolishes Capital Punishment, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June 13, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. The number of executions in the United States, all
performed by state authorities, numbered 23 in 1990, 14 in 1991, 31 in 1992, and 38 in
1993, with a backlog of 2,716 prisoners under a sentence of death at yearend 1993. See
BUREau oFJusT. STAT., DEi'T oFJust., SoutcEaooK oF CRuMIALJusTicE STAnsnCS-1994,
at 591 tbl. 6.76, 597 tbl: 6.81 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1995). In devel-
oping countries, the death penalty is far more common. See, e.g., Bruce Gilley, Rough
Justice: Executions Surge in Tough Anti-Crime Drive, FAR EAST. ECON. REv.,July 4, 1996, at
22 (stating that there were 2,500 publicly revealed executions in China in 1995, with the
actual number of executed persons possibly twice as high).
The total number of inmates (including unconvicted persons) at local, state, and fed-
eral institutions in America was approximately 1.37 million in 1993. See BuREau oF
JusT. STAT., supra, at 534 tbl. 6.13, 548 tbl. 6.26. By contrast, the average daily popula-
tion of penal institutions inJapan (including unconvicted persons) was 45,057 in 1993
and 45,573 in 1994. See Gov ERNr OFJAPAN, SUMMARY OF THE WurrE PAPm ON CPuME
1995, at 68 tbl. r-1. Although the population of the United States is twice that of
Japan's, America incarcerates 30 times as many people. See WoRmD BANK ATLAs 1996, at
8-9 (1995) (giving 1994 population figures of 260,529,000 for the United States and
124,782,000 for Japan) [hereinafter WoRLD BANK ATLAS]. The United States today has
the world's highest reported imprisonment rate and has been at the top for some time.
See Jon Jefferson, Doing Soft Time, ABA J., Apr. 1994, at 62. Between 1990 and 1991,


















Id. at 63 (excluding nations from the former Soviet Union).
123. Cf. supra note 26 (listing the ties that bind OECD members).
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cratic lines means that nations are better situated to negotiate wealth-maxi-
mizing trade agreements and to resolve political disputes peacefully.
But in countries in transition from authoritarian to liberal democracy,
many people may not yet fully accept their newly established economic
and political systems as reflecting fundamental values of what is correct,
proper, or right. Whether these transitional countries continue to establish
or possess liberal democracies will depend upon how well the systems of
liberal democracy work, an outcome that the industrialized democracies
should strive vigorously to achieve. Workable systems can evolve into
entrenched values.
Obviously, the implantation of the values of liberal democracy in Rus-
sia is of paramount concern. 124 Nurturing a democratic Russia is in the
vital national interest of the United States (and the rest of the world) for
very practical reasons-only Russia and the United States possess sufficient
nuclear weapons to end human civilization. 125 Whether by unilateral or
multilateral extensions of financial assistance or political inclusion, the
industrialized democracies should do their utmost to make Russia a strong
liberal democracy. Economic aid should be generous, and Russia should
be incorporated into the activities of the industrialized democracies as
much as possible. 126
Not all basic values are converging and nor, perhaps, should they.
Religious values are not converging in the sense that the same general reli-
gion, such as Christianity, is taking root in a preponderance of coun-
tries.127 Nevertheless, the convergence of economic and political values
means that there is a greater basis for cooperation. For that reason, the
124. As former Secretary of State Kissinger has stated,
Integrating Russia into the international system is a key task of the emerging
international order. It has two components which must be kept in balance:
influencing Russian attitudes and affecting Russian calculations. Generous eco-
nomic assistance and technical advice is necessary to ease the pains of transi-
tion, and Russia should be made welcome in institutions which foster economic,
cultural, and political cooperation-such as the European Security Conference.
HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 818 (1994).
125. See, e.g., Sam Nunn, U.S. Investment in a Peaceful Russia, IssuEs IN SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, Summer 1995, at 27 (Senator Sam Nunn stating that American aid to Rus-
sia to transport, store, and destroy excess nuclear (and other) weapons is in America's
national security interests, and that "[it is in our interest that Russia establish a durable
democratic political system and a durable market-based economic system," id. at 30).
126. See, e.g., John M. Logsdon & Ray A. Williamson, U.S.-Russian Cooperation in
Space: A Good Bet, IssuES IN ScIENcE AND TECHNOLOGY, Summer 1995, at 39 (pointing to
the important scientific, economic, and political value of U.S.-Russian cooperation in
space exploration, especially in the U.S.-led partnership to build the international space
station with Canada, Japan, and Europe).
127. While many of the underlying tenets of different religions may be the same (e.g.,
forbidding killing), people will identify themselves as members of a particular religion
rather than followers of particular tenets. Thus, for example, one may say that she is a
Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, Jew, or some other religious adherent, but not that she is a
follower of the Golden Rule. Of course, it may be the case that the preeminent belief of
one religion is not shared by others (e.g., the Christian belief that Jesus was the son of
God, died to save humanity, and was resurrected).
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"West"12 8-that is, the United States and the other industrialized democra-
cies-should support the process of value convergence.
Sharing the same values creates similar expectations and a common
ground for understanding. The more prevalent reliance upon market
forces to direct production and consumption means that nations are more
likely to trade with and invest in each other. The relative sameness of polit-
ical values, for example, the prevelant use of negotiation rather than mili-
tary force in settling disputes, means that nations can have greater trust in
and less to fear from each other. The similarity of basic values also means
that the different peoples of humanity are one step closer to viewing them-
selves primarily as part of one human society-the human race-though
represented by different governments.
IV. Shaping the Content of Globalization
Despite its ubiquity, globalization is not a given, the inevitable conse-
quence of the confluence of current human events. It is a highly probable
long-term outcome, that should be supported in the face of opposing
forces, in order to ensure its survival.12 9 Although there is no inevitability
that the process of globalization will continue, it seems very likely for eco-
nomic and technological reasons. Autarky and isolationism are disfavored
national policies. Absent major international calamities, globalization will
grow as market integration, economic interdependence, and technological
advances continue.
Nor is the precise shape of globalization a settled outcome. There is
not just one distinct type of globalization. The activities, the principles,
and the value-converging features of globalization are variables influenced
by the leadership of nations such as the United States and international
organizations such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organiza-
tion. How globalization proceeds, especially in its preeminent economic
form, is crucial because globalization can be a double-edged sword. It can
create international problems as well as elevate human beings into a better
128. As previously discussed, the use of the term "West" is convenient to describe the
industrialized democracies but misleading in that Japan, the industrialized democracy
with the second largest economy, is an Asian country with cultural roots in China rather
than Europe and with a non-Christian, non-white population. See supra note 25.
129. Opposition to economic globalization, and the integration of markets, is a
strong, though not dominant, movement in the United States as well as in other industri-
alized countries. Politicians often blame the global integration of markets for declining
wages and increasing unemployment or underemployment. Cf. David E. Sanger, A Flare-
Up of Passions on Trade and Jobs, N.Y. Tnas, Feb. 20, 1996, at Al (Pat Buchanan, candi-
date for the Republican presidential nomination, denouncing the World Trade Organiza-
tion and the North American Free Trade Agreement, and pledging to pull the United
States out of both organizations); David LaGesse, Silence on NAFTA Could Prove Fleeting:
Candidates May Have to Face Issue if -Perot Runs, Mexico Finances Sink, DALLAS MoRN.
NEws, Apr. 6, 1996, at IA, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curmws File (documenting
1992 presidential candidate Ross Perot's opposition to U.S. participation in the World
Trade Organization and the North American Free Trade Agreement).
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world.130
For example, the basic values that globalization spreads can some-
times be at odds with each other and with other important values. Free
market practices can weaken democracy through a race to the bottom in
permitting unethical business practices, and democracy can suppress
human rights through a tyranny of the majority. All three convergent val-
ues can conflict with the desire to protect the environment, a desire that is
predominantly a concern of industrialized countries. 131 Also, economic
and technological interdependency can facilitate the activities of rogue
nations and terrorist groups, and make members of the global community
vulnerable to transnational crime.132 Finally, how globalization copes
with the paradoxical trend of diversification (e.g., ethnic, political, or reli-
gious differentiation) is important. 133
130. It is well recognized that the effects of globalization are not always economic or
beneficial. See, e.g., It's the Global Economy, Stupid: The Corporatization of the World,
THE NATION, July 15-22, 1996 (series of articles on the harmful consequences of the
global economy); DAvm C. KoRTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE THE WORLD (1995); RIcH-
ARD)J. BARNmr &Jol CAVANAGH, GLOBAL DREAMS: IMPIAL CORPORATIONS AND THE NEW
WORLD OaDE (1994); cf. sources cited infra note 186 (describing the clash between
economic development and protection of the environment); JEREMY RIKN, THE END OF
WORK: THE DECLINE OF THE GLOBAL LABOR FORCE AND THE DAWN OF THE Posr-MARKEr ERA
(1995) (criticizing automation and, to that end, globalization).
131. For a discussion of environmental concerns, see infra notes 179-186 and accom-
panying text.
132. At one time the Bank for Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) was the
seventh-largest private bank in the world, with assets of over $20 billion. BCCI's involve-
ment with widespread international banking fraud eventually led to its collapse in 1991.
See, e.g., RAj K. BHALA, FOREIGN BANK REGULATION AFrER BCCI 3-13 (1994); JOHN Kmuw
& HANK BROWN, 102D CONG., THE BCCI AFFAI: A REPORT TO THE ConrrTEE ON FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE (Comm- Print 102-140 1992). According to the
report produced by Senators Kerry and Brown, BCCI was involved in more than just
bank fraud. It was also engaged in laundering drug money, supporting terrorism and
arms trafficking, training drug cartel death squads, and supplying prostitutes. See id. at
61-72. "BCCI cannot be taken as an isolated example of a rogue bank, but a case study
of the vulnerability of the world to international crime on a global scale that is beyond
the current ability of governments to control." Id. at 17. International crime, of course,
involves more than just bank fraud. From bases in one country and supported finan-
cially by another country, terrorists can launch attacks into a third country. See, e.g.,
WESTERN RESPONSES TO TERRORISM (Alex P. Schmid & Ronald D. Crelinsten eds., 1993).
Illegal drugs, especially those consumed in the United States, often have transnational
origins. See, e.g., OFFCE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECUTnVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, 1996: PROGRAM, RESOURCES, AND
EVALUATION 17-20. Finally, from anywhere in the world, one can access pornography or
recipes for homemade bombs through the internet. See, e.g., supra note 91.
133. See Takeyuki Kumamura, New World Emerges, Demands Fresh Set of Strategies:
Globalization, Diversification Both Occurring, Ntam WKLY., July 22, 1996, at 7;J. P. Kav-
anagh, A Time of Crisis, Challenge for U.N., JAPAN TIMEs, Apr. 8-14, 1996, at 9 (weekly
edition); cf. KISSINGER, supra note 124, at 806-08. The Soviet Union has splintered into
fifteen separate nations, and ethnic groups within nations (e.g., Kurdish rebels in Turkey
and Iraq, Chechen rebels in Russia, and Tamil rebels in Sri Lanka) have called for
national independence. Strong group identification-whether ethnic, political, or reli-
gious--has led to fanaticism, hatred, and killings in Rwanda, Burundi, Cambodia, and
Bosnia.
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Managing globalization will require policies and programs that care-
fully nurture, accommodate tensions among, and emphasize the universal-
ity of convergent values. These values need to be supported because the
presence of free markets, democracy, and human rights in some countries
may represent currently ascendant economic and political systems-
existing superficial conditions-rather than fundamental values. Citizens of
more countries may now describe their economic system as "market"
based, their structure of government as "democratic," and their panoply of
civil liberties as the protection of "human rights." Yet, for newly formed
capitalist democracies, their citizens may not completely accept these con-
ditions as fundamental values-deeply felt beliefs of what is right.13 4
Balancing these values, when they conflict with each other or with the
protection of the environment, is necessary to avoid, primarily, a race to
the bottom in economic practices and the unreasonable dominance of eco-
nomic activities over political and environmental concerns. 135 The univer-
sality of convergent values essentially means that human beings will work
to ensure that the same general rights-including the satisfaction of basic
needs-are available in all countries. 13 6 The idea that particular rights
should be universally present, without geographic limitation, is important
not just to the convergence of fundamental values but also to the belief that
all human beings belong to the same society and are entitled to the same
rights.
A. Fulfilling Western Responsibilities
The industrialized democracies have an essential, indispensable role in
determining the policies and programs for globalization that will promote
common values, balance competing values, solidify respect for the rule of
law, and increase empathy among nations. This role is given not by the
grace of God but by a simple fact of economics and by the deep roots of
liberal democratic values in the industrialized democracies. They have the
lion's share of world wealth, and by it, the ability to finance and influence
heavily the course of globalization. In addition, free markets, democracy,
and the protection of human rights are fundamental values, permanent and
enduring, in the industrialized democracies.
134. The belief of many people in these nations in the values of liberal democracy
may be quite fragile. Further, the shift in economic or political systems for nations pre-
viously under command economies or authoritarian political regimes has created sub-
stantial numbers of losers as well as winners. It would be in the self-interest of the
industrialized democracies to support those countries in transition from command and
authoritarian systems to market and democratic systems. Russia, in particular, should
receive generous financial and political help. Without the bold actions of the former
Soviet leadership, the end of the Cold War-and the subsequently reduced threat of
nuclear war, freedom for the east European countries from Soviet domination, and
reunification of Germany-would not have occurred. See PHnP Zmauow & CoN-
DOLEEZZA Rica, GmAw UNIFID AND EUROPE TRANSFomaD: A STUDY iN STATECRAFr 4-19,
369-70 (1995).
135. See infra notes 170-186 and accompanying text.
136. Cf. supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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It is undeniable that the industrialized nations dominate the world
economically. These nations are bound together by the common values of
liberal democracy, and are either allied or on friendly terms with the
United States. Table 1, below, provides figures for the population, econ-
omy, contributions to the United Nations, foreign aid (official development
assistance, or ODA), and numbers of the world's largest corporations from
the twenty-three industrialized nations collectively referred to as the
"West": the United States, Japan, the fifteen-nation European Union, and
six other rich industrialized nations. 137
TABLE 1
Population G.N.P. Regular U.N. Foreign No. of
in in Budget Aid World's
Thousands Billions of Assessment (ODA) in 500 Largest
(1994) Dollars Rate (%) Billions Companies
(1994) (1996) of Dollars (1995)
(1995)
U.S.A. 260,529 6,737,367 25.0000 7.303 153
Japan 124,782 4,321,136 15.4350 14.484 141
European 370,221 7,577,378 35.2825 31.513 154
Union
137. The data in Table 1 is derived from several sources. See WoRID BANK ATLAS,
supra note 122, at 8-9 (population figures), 18-19 (GNP figures), 20 (world population;
world GNP calculated by multiplying world population by world per capita GNP);
UNrrIED NATIONS SECRETARIAT, STATUS OF CorIBUTIONS AS AT 29 FEBRUARY 1996, Annex
II, at 5-9 (ST/ADM/SER.B/487, Mar. 14, 1996) (regular U.N. budget assessment rate);
Financial Flows to Developing Countries in 1995: Sharp Decline in Official Aid; Private
Flows Rise, OECD PREsS RL.EASE, June 11, 1996 (Org. Econ. Co-op. & Dev.) (giving pre-
liminary figures for OECD member foreign aid in 1995; differences for "West" total are
rounded off) [hereinafter OECD PREss RELEASE]; Global 500, supra note 45, at 102, F-30
to F-40 (ranking corporations by revenues).
The "other [rich nations]" mentioned in Table 1 are Australia, Canada, Iceland, New
Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland. They, together with the United States,Japan, and the
nations of the EU, are classified by the International Monetary Fund as the twenty-three
industrialized nations, and are what this Article refers to as the "West." Cf. WomL
ECONOMIC OuTLooic, supra note 25, at 155-57. All of the 23 nations except for Greece
and Iceland provide foreign aid to developing countries. See OECD PEss RELEASE, supra,
at 9. Countries that provide foreign aid but that are not among the 23 industrialized
nations are not included in the ODA figure. Such non-ODA foreign aid, however, is
small by comparison with ODA foreign aid. See, e.g., OECF to Close Seoul Office as S.
Korea Aid Role Grows, DAILY YOMIURI, Aug. 17, 1996, at 12, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File (reporting that in 1994 South Korea provided $150 million in for-
eign economic assistance).
The figures for world population and GNP, which were taken from the World Bank,
apparently omit data from the Republic of China (i.e., Taiwan), a relatively rich and
populous nation. See WoRLD BANK ATLAS, supra note 122, at 8-9, 18-20. In 1995, Tai-
wan's population of 21.3 million was larger than Australia's, and its GNP, by exchange
rate conversion, was $253.82 billion, ranking 18th in the world. See Sofia Wu, ROC
Ranks 18th in Terms of GNP, CENTRAL NEws AGENCY, May 30, 1996, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Cumws File; cf. WoRLD BANK ATLAS, supra note 122, at 8 (giving a 1994
population figure of 17.8 million for Australia).
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As Table 1 shows, the West, with less than 15% of the world's population,
generates over 75% of the world's GNP, and has the financial resources to
pay most of the U.N.'s regular budget, provide substantial amounts of
foreign aid, and produce nearly all of the world's largest corporations. Just
America and Japan together account for over 40% of world GNP.' 38
The hand of the West is also dominant in the major international
economic institutions which provide substantial flows of financial capital
to developing countries and to countries in economic transition from
socialism to capitalism.139 Table 2, below, shows that the big five and the
138. Recent data give first quarter 1996 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) figures of
$7,417.8 billion for the United States and $5,028.7 billion for Japan. See SURvEY oF
CuRREr BusuiEss, July 1996, supra note 40, at 5 tbl. 1.1 (giving U.S. GDP for first
quarter of 1996); Economic Indicators, Numoc WxLy., July 22, 1996, at 13 (giving a
nominal, seasonally adjusted, annual GDP of Y502,873.6 billion for January-March
1996, applying an exchange rate of Y100 - $1, cf. Currency Markets, supra note 41, at
D17). U.S. GDP and GNP are virtually equivalent. See, e.g., SURVEY OF CURRENT
BusINEss, July 1996, supra note 40, at 7 tbl. 1.9 (giving first quarter 1996 GNP of
$7,423.1 billion for the United States). GNP equals the GDP of a country plus its net
overseas property income. See infra note 141 (defining gross domestic product).
139. As of June 30, 1996, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD) had approved loans totaling $164,766,000,000, of which $110,246,000,000 was
outstanding. See Wom.D BANY, supra note 28, at 173. Also providing substantial
funding to developing countries are the IBRD's two affiliates, the International
Development Association (IDA), which provides low-interest rate credits (loans) to the
poorer developing countries, and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which
finances private sector ventures and projects primarily in less developed countries. As
of June 30, 1996, the IDA approved $97,450,000,000 in development credits, of which
$72,821,000,000 was outstanding. See id. at 203. As ofJune 30, 1996, the IFC provided
cumulative gross commitments of $30,380,906,000 for 1707 enterprises. See
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CoRPoRATioN, ANNUAL REPORT 1996, at 143 (1996) [hereinafter
IFC]. As of April 30, 1996, the IMF had total loans outstanding of SDR 42,040,000,000
(approximately $60.961 billion). See IMF, supra note 34, at ii, 178 (using an exchange
rate of one SDR = $1.45006; technically, member countries of the IMF purchase
currencies rather than borrow from the IMF). The SDR (special drawing right) is an
international reserve asset whose value is a function of other currency values. Effective









See id. at 143.
Other important multilateral economic institutions include regional development
banks such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (EBRD), which provide funding and technical assistance for
development in their respective regions. As of December 31, 1995, the ADB had
approved loans totaling $31,426,926,000, of which $17,530,101,000 were outstanding,
to member countries in the Asian and Pacific region. See AsIAN DEvELOPMmN BANK,
ANNUAL REPORT 1995, at 154 (1995) [hereinafter ADB]. As of December 31, 1995, the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development provided ECU 7,853,000,000
(approximately $10.072 billion) in financing through loans, equity participation, and
guarantees to countries and projects in central and eastern Europe. See EUROPEAN BANK
FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEvELoPmEwr, ANNUAL REPORT 1995, at 15-17, 53 n.2 (1995)
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other industrialized democracies of the West together have a commanding
share of the voting power in such major international economic institutions
as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD),
International Finance Corporation (IFC), and International Development
Association (IDA) of the World Bank Group, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 140
(using ECU 1.2826 = $1 exchange rate) [hereinafter EBRD]. The ECU, or European
currency unit, is a composite currency and a unit of account used by the European
Union. Similar to the SDR, its value is determined through a basket of EU member
country currencies, which is composed of the individual currencies of the twelve mem-
ber nations of the EU prior to the addition of Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995. The
currency composition of the ECU will be frozen until the Euro, the single European
currency, is introduced. See EUROPE IN FIGURES 34243 (4th ed. 1995). The ECU will be
replaced by the Euro on January 1, 1999. See The Road to Economic and Monetary Union
(visited Oct. 15, 1996) <http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/emu/enscsc.html> (from web-
site of the European Union).
140. See WORLD BANc, supra note 28, at 178 (voting power in IBRD as of June 30,
1996); IFC, supra note 139, at 123-24 (as of June 30, 1996); WORLD BAKm, supra note 28,
at 205 (voting power in IDA as of June 30, 1996); IMF, supra note 34, at 209 (as of April
30, 1996); ADB, supra note 139, at 158 (as of December 31, 1995); EBRD, supra note
139, at 60 & n.* (voting rights in EBRD as of December 31, 1995, calculated from data;
the voting rights of the United States are restricted because of non-payment of some
capital subscriptions, and are reduced from 10.12%). In the Asian Development Bank,
the nations with the largest voting power in addition to Japan and the United States are
Pacific Rim countries: China (6.65%), India (6.54%), Australia (6.01%), Canada
(5.47%), and South Korea (5.28%). See ADB, supra note 139, at 158-59. The countries
of the "West" are listed in supra note 25.
Another important international financial institution is the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS), whose objectives are "to promote the cooperation of central banks, to
provide additional facilities for international financial operations and to act as trustee or
agent for international financial settlements." BANK FOR INrERNAoNAL SErrLEMErS,
66TH AN uAL REPORT, Apr. 1, 1995-Mar. 31, 1996, at 186. The members of the BIS are
central banks, and its seventeen-member board of directors consists of the governors of
the central banks of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and appointed
directors from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. See id. at 186, 194. Until recently, there were 32 member central banks; in
September 1996, nine central banks were admitted as new members (Brazil, China,
Hong Kong, India, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and South Korea). See The
BIS: Join the Club, EcONOMIST, Sept. 14, 1996, at 78.
1997 Globalization and the Convergence of Values
TABLE 2
Population G.N.P. Regular U.N. Foreign No. of
in in Budget Aid World's
Thousands Billions of Assessment (ODA) in 500 Largest
(1994) Dollars Rate (%) Billions Companies
(1994) (1996) of Dollars (1995)
(1995)
Other 62,204 1,323,079 5.4125 5.700 28
[Rich Nations]
West: 817,736 19,958,960 81.1300 59.002 476
US, EU,
Japan & Other
West's Share 14.59% 77.44% 81.13% 100% 95.20%
of World
Total
World Total 5,603,000 25,773,800 100.0100 59.002 500
While there are different ways of calculating the collective economic
power of the West, there is no question of the West's economic importance
to the world.14 1 As much as possible, the West-principally the economic
141. For example, on the basis of purchasing power parities, the International
Monetary Fund calculates that the group of 23 industrial countries account for 53.9% of
world gross domestic product (GDP), with developing countries accounting for 41.2%,
and countries in transition (e.g., Russia, Hungary, and Poland), 4.9%. See WORM
ECONOMIC OUtLooic, supra note 25, at 156. There are two common ways to calculate a
nation's economy or productive output: gross national product (GNP) or gross
domestic product (GDP). The quantitative difference between the two is not significant
for the great majority of countries. Table 1, above, uses GNP figures provided by the
World Bank The GDP, however, is the most commonly used measure of national output
by both domestic and international authorities. See, e.g., SURVEY OF CURRENT Bus,.ss,
July 1996, supra note 40, at 1-8; WORMD ECONOMIC OtrrLoou, supra note 25, at 167-79.
The GDP measures the net value of the goods and services produced in a country from
economic activity. See Dic-iotNARY OF MODERN EcONOMIcS, supra note 11, at 297-298.
The GDP of a country is related to its GNP in that GDP plus net property income from
abroad equals GNP. See id. Net property income from abroad equals the difference
between what domestic residents receive in profits, dividends, and interest on foreign
assets, and what foreign residents receive in profits, dividends, and interest on domestic
assets. See id. at 304.
Also, either GNP or GDP can be calculated by the use of foreign exchange rate
conversions or by purchasing power parities (PPP). Exchange rate conversion
emphasizes the international purchasing power of a currency (e.g., dollar or yen),
whereas PPP emphasizes the domestic purchasing power of a currency (e.g., how much
of that currency is needed to buy a basket of goods and services in domestic markets).
In comparing national economies, whether in terms of GDP or GNP, Table I uses data
based on foreign exchange rate conversions. In the foreign exchange rate method, actual
market rates are used to compare national economies. The foreign exchange rate is
what one currency is worth in terms of another. For instance, a visitor to Japan will
need yen to buy goods and services, and would receive Y1,000,000 if she went to a bank
to exchange $10,000 for yen (at a foreign exchange rate of $1 = Y100). The foreign
exchange rate method makes possible the comparison of the U.S. economy (which is
expressed in dollars) with the Japanese economy (which is expressed in yen). See
WoRLD BANK ATLAs, supra note 122, at 33. Thus, for example, the GDP of Japan in yen
terms is converted into dollars by using market foreign exchange rates, and the Japanese
GDP can be compared with that of the United States.
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giants of the United States, Japan, and the European Union-should act
collectively to create a humane globalization. These three entities should
undertake to cooperate even more extensively than they already do. This
will require American acceptance of a greater role for the European Union
and Japan in western decision-making, a process that historically has been
carried out mostly by American leadership. It will also require a more
vigorous and creative Japanese presence in international affairs.
The United States, Japan, and the European Union are singled out, not
because their citizenry are inherently wiser and more capable than those of
other nations, but because their economic power tempered by the
humanitarian constraints of their political systems make them best suited
The foreign exchange rate conversion method disregards the domestic purchasing
power of dollars and yen-the concept of purchasing power parity. See Seita, supra note
79, at 483 n.44; see also McCurrencies: Where's the Beef?, ECONomisT, Apr. 27, 1996, at
82 (providing a brief summary description of PPP). A given amount of yen may actually
buy much less in Japan than what the market foreign exchange rate for dollars and yen
would suggest. For instance, if the same basket of goods and services would cost $100
in America and Y15,000 yen injapan, the PPP method would yield a PPP exchange rate
of $1 = Y150. Thus, if the U.S. economy was $6 trillion and the Japanese economy, Y450
trillion, a PPP exchange rate of $1 = Y150 would make the U.S. economy twice that of
Japan's ($6 trillion to $3 trillion), while a market foreign exchange rate of $1 = Y100
would make the U.S. economy only one-third larger than Japan's ($6 trillion to $4.5
trillion). There is often a difference between market foreign exchange rates and the
exchange rates implied by PPP. Both methods are used in international measurements.
See WoRD BANrK ATLAs, supra note 122, at 18-19, 33 (giving GNP by market foreign
exchange rates and giving per capita GNP in PPP terms).
Nevertheless, this Article uses data based on foreign exchange rates because this
method better measures the international importance of a nation's economy than the
PPP method. The international purchasing power of a currency-what it will buy in
other countries-is determined by foreign exchange markets, not by PPP. For example,
whatever a yen might buy at home, what it can buys overseas determines the
international importance of the yen. See Seita, supra note 79, at 482-84 & nn.43-45.
Also, there is some latitude in determining the financial strength of a nation's
corporations. Table I uses a ranking based on corporate revenues. Other rankings are
possible, such as that based on apparent market value. See The Business Week Global
1000, Bus. WK-, July 8, 1996, at 46, 49 (ranking the world's 1000 most valuable
corporations by their market value on May 31, 1996, using May month-end exchange
rates for foreign corporations). Under a market value ranking, the 1000 most valuable









See id. at 49-80. Under this method, the United States has by far the single largest
number of companies. It is a method, however, that probably has more variability than
a ranking based on revenues. For example, while Japanese companies accounted for
48% of the $5.7 trillion market value of the global 1000 in 1988, they had dropped to
just 23% of $11.2 trillion in 1996; U.S. companies went from 30% in 1988 to 46% in
1996. See William C. Symonds et al., The Globetrotters Take Over: Worldwide Champions
Outpace Domestic Competitors, Bus. WK, July 8, 1996, at 46. Regardless of the method,
however, the dominance of the West is clear.
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to shape a better world if they so choose. There is also the reality that
although it is the world's richest country and only superpower, the United
States cannot manage or finance globalization on its own. Because the
three are so important economically, it would be a mistake, as some have
gratuitously suggested, for the United States and the European Union to
unite to isolate Japan politically and economically.1 42
When necessary, the West should also use its economic power to flesh
out the details of market economies, democratic governments, and human
rights in the globalization context. While the devil may lie in details, some
142. For examples of the literature favoring the isolation of Japan, see Charles A.
Kupchan, Reviving the West, 75 FOREGN AFF., May-June 1996, at 92 (urging the creation
of an Atlantic Union, an economic alliance between Western Europe and North
America); Lind, supra note 25 (urging creation of a Euramerican bloc, consisting of the
United States, Canada, and the European Union, that would "present a united front
towardJapan in trade matters and toward China with respect to security matters," id. at
5).
A policy of isolatingJapan and treating it as a potential enemy would cause problems
dwarfing current difficulties and lower Japan's incentive to make international
contributions. See generally Seita, supra note 79 (discussing the frictions between the
United States and Japan); Seita, supra note 25 (discussing the benefits of fully utilizing
Japan's economic and human resources). It creates conflict where none presently exists
and would be reminiscent of past colonial days when white, Christian nations
dominated or subjugated most of the non-Christian world. Alternatively, it has been
argued that a "mixed-race or nonwhite majority in the United States ... will emerge a
few generations hence ... [and] ensure that a Euramerican bloc, far from being a 'white'
alliance, would be the most racially diverse bloc on the planet." Lind, supra, at 5.
And yet, today, the Euramerica bloc is predominately white, and political power in the
United States is exercised overwhelmingly by its white majority. Currently, there is one
senator of Black heritage, two of Asian or Pacific Islander heritage, and none of Hispanic
heritage. See BUREAU OF THE CE.sus, U.S. DEP'T OF CowmEa, STATISICAL ABStmACt OF
THE UMrED STATES 1996, at 279 tbl. 442 (116th ed.) (as ofJanuary 3, 1995); Elizabeth A.
Palmer, Women, Blacks Hold Steady, DAYrON DAIty NEws, Nov. 8, 1996, at 15A, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (reporting that the November 1996 elections
produced no change in the number of minorities in the Senate). The two senators of
Asian or Pacific Islander heritage are both from Hawaii. See Ed Henry, Seldom-Heard
Akaka Takes the Floor to Assail the Treatment of Asians, RoLL CALL, Mar. 24, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (Senator Daniel Akaka and Senator
Daniel Inouye). In addition, Senator Ben Campbell of Colorado states that he is partially
of Northern Cheyenne Native American descent. See Steve Jackson, Athlete, Artist,
Indian Chief. From Dark Horse to Nighthorse, It's Been One Hell of a Ride for Ben
Campbell, DENvER WEsTwoRD, Sept. 12, 1996 (Features Section), available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File. Today, there are Asian-American governors in the states of
Washington and Hawaii, but there are no Black governors. See Turnout Tuesday Hit a
Record Low of 49 Percent of Eligible Voters, AGENcE FwAca PRassE, Nov. 6, 1996, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (Washington state elected the first Asian-American
governor outside of Hawaii); Whitman Stands Out Among Her Peers: The Only Woman at
Governors Meeting, BERGEN REcORD, Aug. 1, 1995, at A9, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File (Asian-American governor in Hawaii but no Black governor in any
state); Louis Sahagun, American Album: Hawaii Governor Fights an Economic Undertow,
L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 21, 1995, at A5 (Governor Ben Cayetano of Hawaii, a Filipino American,
eying a re-election bid in 1998). There is also only one nonwhite justice out of nine on
the United States Supreme Court. Hawaii is a state where the nonwhite majority has
arrived, a factor which no doubt has contributed towards its selection of nonwhites as
well as whites to Hawaii's highest political and judicial offices. See Nancy Yoshihara,
Benjamin Cayetano: On the Success of Asian American Politicians-or Lack Thereof, L.A.
TIMEs, Sept. 17, 1995, at M3.
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refinement of principles may be required to create a "level playing field" for
business competition and to balance competing values. That may open up
the charge that the views of the West are being imposed upon, and not
necessarily to the benefit of, the rest of the world.
While such an allegation would have substantial historical validity, it
could be deflected by the promulgation of rules based on those internal
practices of the industrialized democracies. These rules would be a
modification of the "Golden Rule." Nations should do unto others what
the nations of the West do unto themselves. That undeniably involves the
value judgment that the industrialized democracies are better models for
economic and political development. It is a value judgement, however, that
seems to be shared by most human beings: the flow of immigration
between the West and the rest of the world is decidedly one-sided in the
former's favor. 143
143. For a discussion of migration periods and patterns, see BARNar & CAVANAGH,
supra note 130, at 296-309. Immigration to the major industrialized nations from each
other is relatively low. For example, in 1993, the number of immigrants to the United
States from the other G-7 (the largest industrialized) nations was dwarfed by the number
from developing nations and former communist nations:

















Former Soviet Union 58,600
Vietnam 59,600
See 1995 STATISTICAL ABSfRACr, supra note 78, at 11 tbl. 8. While immigration occurs
primarily for economic reasons, this data suggests that democracy and human rights
also positively influence immigration.
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B. Adhering to the Rule of Law
The process of converging values through the activities of globalization is
facilitated by procedural mechanisms and substantive principles. Without
them, globalization might eventually consist solely of the intermingling of
peoples and the economic interdependence of countries without the shar-
ing of values. Convergence is reinforced by procedural mechanisms that
implement substantive principles which are derived from and flesh out the
meaning of convergent values. One mechanism might consist of unilateral
action in which one nation, particularly the United States, imposes its
views of appropriate economic behavior on another country.144 While an
economically dominant nation may get its way, the subordinate country
may not accept the substantive principle used to justify the unilateral
action. The latter country may simply see the "principle" of "might makes
right."
Another mechanism exists in multilateral agreements in which
nations collectively determine the international legal rights of individual
nations.' 45 Multilateral agreements often contain dispute settlement pro-
cedures that attempt, in theory, to administer impartially the rule of law in
judging national, firm, or individual conduct.146 The "law" would be made
up of substantive principles that reflect or accommodate clashes among
convergent values. The use of the rule of law is today one of the most
effective means to reinforce common values, especially in the areas con-
nected with international trade. The rule of law also avoids the antagonism
generated when one nation imposes its views on other nations.
In a broad sense, the rule of law requires respect for substantive prin-
ciple, not merely power or chance, to settle disputes. 147 Implicit, too, in
the rule of law is that disputes are peacefully settled whenever possible,
144. Unilateral attempts at fostering common values have been successful in the after-
math of war when a victorious nation occupied a vanquished one. For example, accord-
ing to one commentator, the American-catalyzed creation of a permanent and peaceful
democracy in Japan "is one of history's greatest and most constructive feats of social
engineering." MuRAvctnK, supra note 103, at 107. For less dramatic and effective unilat-
eral actions by the United States, see infra note 149.
145. See supra notes 25 (European Union), 38 (Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement, North American Free Trade Agreement).
146. The dispute settlement procedure of the World Trade Organization applies to the
agreement establishing the WTO as well as the numerous WTO agreements. See Under-
standing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M.
112 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding]. Many bilateral agreements
do not have dispute resolution procedures. See, e.g., Seita, supra note 79, at 513-15 &
nn.140-44 (listing 21 bilateral treaties between Japan and the United States and the scar-
city of dispute resolution procedures in the treaties).
147. Cf. GRANT GI.MoRE, THE AGEs OF AMaUc.AN LAw 105 (1977) (the rule of law
"emphasizes principally the importance of procedural due process, the nice observance
of established rules, the right of the accused to confront his accuser in open court before
he is sent to jail"). For purposes of this Article, the rule of law is briefly discussed only
to show its role in facilitating the convergence of values. What is law, what is interna-
tional law, and what is the rule of law are questions that compel complicated and
lengthy answers. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONcmr OF LAw (1961); LON L. Futa,
ANATOMY OF THE LAW (1968); HANs KELN, THE PuRE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight
479
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and that negotiations and economic sanctions are utilized before military
operations are commenced. In the globalization context, acceptance of the
rule of law means that most nations will not only acknowledge the applica-
bility of substantive principles to a transnational problem but also accept a
solution recommended by an impartial international body.148 The
absence of either condition precludes the existence of a rule of law, and
also militates against the development of convergent values.
First, without the recognition that there are substantive principles
which are relevant to analyzing a conflict, there is no rule of law because
there are no laws to apply. Without substantive principles, convergent val-
ues are less likely to emerge. Second, a nation should respect the decisions
of a mediating or adjudicatory international organization. If a nation
chooses to settle a dispute unilaterally, there is no rule of law since any
principle, even if meritorious, would be enforced unequally. The unilateral
actor would be a law enforcer against other nations only, and presumably
never the object of enforcement.149 Such discriminatory enforcement
diminishes the validity of substantive principles because they do not apply
to all nations, and impedes the acceptance of their values as convergent
values.
At the same time, the international tribunal or body that implements
the rule of law must be impartial and competent, for nations are more
likely to abide by the rule of law when they believe that it can be adminis-
tered fairly and wisely.150 Further, before abiding by the rule of law in a
trans., 1967); INrERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY (Anthony D'Amato ed., 1994); HENRY J.
STEINER Er AL, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS: MATEIALs AND TEXr (4th ed. 1994).
148. One possible embodiment of the rule of law would be the WTO dispute settle-
ment procedures. See, e.g., Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 22, supra note 146;
The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, GENERAL AG PEMmN ON TARIrs AND TRADE,
GATT Focus, May 1994, at 12-14.
149. Unilateral measures by one country, even if ostensibly taken to protect desirable
principles, may engender ill will among other countries affected by those measures.
These countries may react by questioning the justifications of the unilateral actor. Even-
tually, the validity of the principles may come into question if they are applied only to
protect one country's interests. For example, the United States frequently takes a unilat-
eral approach to solving economic problems with its trading parmers. See, e.g., Trade
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978 (1974) (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)) (authorizing the United States to take unilateral action against
unfair, even though not internationally unlawful, economic practices of foreign coun-
tries). This has not generated feelings of goodwill among U.S. allies. See, e.g., EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, REPORT ON UNITED STATES BARRERS TO TRADE AN INVESTMENr 1996, at 9-10
(criticizing section 301); Hiroshi Nakamae, U.S. Worst Violator of Trade Rules, MITI Says,
NcKm WKLY., June 6, 1994, at 2 (in its 1994 Report on Unfair Trade Policies by Major
Trading Partners, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry accuses the
United States of pursuing unfair trade practices such as section 301).
150. A nation may reject the jurisdiction of an international tribunal to adjudicate a
dispute it has with another country. The rejection may be motivated by a perception
that the tribunal is biased, or that the tribunal may judge fairly but contrary to the
interests of the rejecting nation. It may be difficult to determine the motivation for such
a rejection. For example, in 1986 the International Court ofJustice held that the United
States violated international law (customary international law as well as treaty obliga-
tions) by mining Nicaraguan ports, and stated that the United States and Nicaragua
should hold settlement talks to determine the amount of appropriate reparations. See
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particular area, nations usually must conclude that the substantive princi-
ples of law are generally acceptable to them. Of course, some principles
may be imprecise in order to accommodate different national views about
how detailed these principles should be. Because nations may have vary-
ing opinions on the desired details of substantive principles and may make
political compromises to arrive at their language, these principles may be
vague or incomplete.151 The tribunal or other body that interprets these
principles may have considerable leeway to refine, embellish, or expand
the meaning of the substantive law.
While an immediate benefit of the rule of law is that current disputes
are resolved, a long-term benefit is that the utilization of reason and rules
are substituted for power or force. If powerful and weak nations alike wil
follow the rule of law, then the law, not military or economic power, will
determine rights and resolve conflicts. Recognition of the rule of law also
means that the substantive principles used to resolve disputes are automat-
ically enhanced since their selection legitimizes them (they are the "law")
and reinforces the values that they represent. While these principles are
likely to be popular and respected in order to have been chosen as the
substantive bases for conflict resolution, their selection is likely to
strengthen and broaden their appeal, enhancing the durability of their val-
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 4 (June 27). The United
States, however, did not comply with the court's opinion, even though the United
Nations Charter compels U.N. members to comply with decisions of the International
Court ofJustice in cases in which the member is a party. See U.N. Cutm- art. 94, para.
1. Prior to the date of the decision, the United States notified the United Nations that it
would end its thirty-eight year acceptance of the "compulsory jurisdiction" of the Inter-
national Court of Justice. Compare United States Department of State Letter and State-
ment Concerning Termination of Acceptance of LCJ. Compulsory Jurisdiction (Oct. 7,
1985), 24 LL.M. 1742, with United States Declaration of Aug. 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 1218,
T.I.A.S. No.1598, 1 U.N.T.S. 9 (compulsory jurisdiction effective six months after
deposit of the declaration with the United Nations). Under the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, a state could recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the court
over cases involving that state, thereby avoiding the need for a special agreement to
permit the court to hear each individual case. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNA-IONAL COURT
OFJUSTICE art. 36, para. 2, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945). The United States
withdrew its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction in order to avoid having the court
decide Nicaragua's case against the United States. The court, however, held that the
attempt to withdraw jurisdiction was ineffective. See 1986 LCJ. at 7. See generally THE
UNITED STATES AND THE COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF Jus-
ncE (Anthony C. Arend ed. 1986).
151. For example, the term "subsidy" was never defined under GATT, although subsi-
dies were a long recognized problem in international trade. See JACKSON, supra note 24,
at 382-83; JACKSON, supra note 36, at 255; GATT, supra note 29, arts. VI, XVI. Further,
the United States had grandfather rights permitting it to levy countervailing duties upon
subsidized goods without finding material injury to domestic industry, otherwise a
requirement under GATT art. VI, para. 6(a). See JACKSON, supra note 24, at 258. In
another example, the United Nations defined the international crime of genocide to
exclude acts against economic or political classes. Genocide covers acts only against a
"national, ethnical, racial or religious group." Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 32, art. 2. The Convention has never been
applied. SeeJames Podgers, The World Cries Out for Justice, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1996, at 52, 54
(discussing the international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia).
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ues. Thus, the choice of interpreters and the selection of substantive prin-
ciples are important decisions.
At times, the viability of the rule of law may require enforcement to
ensure adherence to the rule of law. In economic disputes, there could be
collectively authorized sanctions. 152 When there are acts of aggression
over territorial disputes and economic sanctions have failed to prevent a
breach of the peace, the use of military force could be authorized. For
example, in 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait over alleged disputed property
rights and territory; in response, the United Nations authorized the use of
force by the United States and its allies against the Iraq in the 1991 Gulf
War.153
For countries like North Korea and Iraq that are not democracies and
do not protect human rights, the industrialized democracies should pres-
ent a unified front in encouraging change and discouraging political
oppression and the use of force. While the ad hoc international criminal
tribunals for Bosnia and Rwanda are important, the establishment of a per-
manent international criminal court will better solidify the idea that war
crimes must be condemned and adjudicated by the international commu-
nity.154 Although it is late, there ought to be a tribunal for Cambodia.
There is still no justice for the atrocities against the Cambodian people that
occurred in the mid to late 1970s, in what many have called as the
equivalent of genocide. 155 The establishment of a standing emergency
peacekeeping force might prevent the future reoccurrence of atrocities that
152. See, e.g., Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 146, art. 22.
153. The United Nations has rarely sanctioned the collective use of force under Chap-
ter VII of the U.N. Charter. The defense of South Korea in 1950 against an invasion by
North Korea, the humanitarian relief operations in Somalia in 1992, and the invasion of
Haiti in 1994 are the only other examples. See ARmD & BECK, supra note 65, at 51-56;
Multinational Force Dispatched to Pave Way for Aristide's Return, U.N. CHRON., Dec. 1994,
at 20.
154. Established by the United Nations, these ad hoc tribunals may presage the estab-
lishment of a permanent international criminal court. See Podgers, supra note 151, at
52. See generally LAwYEns ComierTEm FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST:
1996 QuADRENNIAL REPORT ON HuMAN RIGHTS Am U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 1-10 (1996); Paul
D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality of an International Criminal
Court, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73, 96-101, 13647 (1995); Leila S. Wexler, The Pro-
posed Permanent International Criminal Court: An Appraisal, 29 CoRNELL INr'L LJ. 665
(1996).
155. See, e.g., Payam Akhavan, Enforcement of the Genocide Convention: A Challenge to
Civilization, 8 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 229, 230 n.5 (1995); Barbara Crossette, Waiting for
Justice in Cambodia, N.Y. Tnmrs, Feb. 25, 1996, § 4 at 5. In the late 1970s, Pol Pot's
Khmer Rouge was responsible for massive numbers of killings and deaths among the
Cambodian people. See, e.g., CAMBODIA 1975-1978: RP'aDzvous wrrH DEATH (Karl D.
Jackson ed., 1989) (essays discussing the Khmer Rouges regime in Cambodia). But see
DAVID P. CHANDLER, THE TRAGEDY OF CAMBODIAN HISTORY: PoLITICS, WAR, ANi REVOLU-
TION SINCE 1945, at 236-72 (1991). The number of people who died under the Khmer
Rouge government was enormous:
More than one million people are dead to begin with. Included are not only the
victims of Pol Pot's killing fields, where members of the former ruling elite were
cut down, but also, hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children who
died from disease and starvation directly resulting from the regime's misguided
and draconian policies.
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took place in Cambodia, Rwanda, Burundi, Bosnia, and elsewhere.' 5 6
Also, although there has been a general convergence of economic and
political values, the application of these values to specific situations is, in
most cases, yet to be determined.' 5 7 When it becomes important to specify
how these values will apply to particular cases, the use of a multilateral
forum will help to win international acceptance of the principles selected to
Out of 7.3 million Cambodians said to be alive on April 17, 1975, less than 6
million remained to greet the Vietnamese occupiers in the waning days of 1978.
Although precise figures may never be known, present calculations suggest that
in the Cambodian revolution a greater proportion of the population perished
than in any other revolution during the twentieth century.
Karl D. Jackson, Introduction: The Khmer Rouge in Context, in CAM.BODIA 1975-1978:
RENDEzvous wrni DEATH, supra, at 3 (footnote omitted); CHANDR supra, at 1.
156. The United Nations might establish a standing emergency force to prevent
armed conflicts (in addition to rescuing victims of natural disasters). See generally Per-
manent Peacekeeping: The Theoretical & Practical Feasibility of a United Nations Force, 28
CoNEL Imrr'. J. 619, 645 (1995) (symposium on Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, &
Peacebuilding: The Role of the United Nations in Global Conflict). While the U.N. emer-
gency force would not be able to intervene in matters involving major power interests, it
might be able to move quickly to prevent reoccurrences of tragedies such as those in
Cambodia, Rwanda, Burundi, and Bosnia, where the international community failed to
prevent massive numbers of deaths. At some point, internal conflicts become so horren-
dous that outside nations ought to intervene:
[A]cts of genocide cannot be tolerated by the community of nations. When peo-
ple are being exterminated because of their ethnicity, race, or social class,
outside powers have not only the right but the compulsion to intervene. Ideally
they should do this in concert, whether through the United Nations or simply by
joint agreement. It was shameful that the United States did not intervene in
Rwanda in 1994 to stop the slaughter of half a million Tutsi by the rival Hutu
tribe. France alone, to its credit, sent its troops to end the bloodshed. It was no
less shameful that in the 1970s not a single Western nation moved against the
Khmer Rouge that killed an estimated two million of their own people in their
drive to "purify" Cambodia for communism. Finally, it was neighboring Viet-
nam that entered the killing fields to stop the genocide.
RONALD STEEL, TEMPTATIONS OF A SUPERPOWER 130 (1995); see also NEw REPuBc, Aug. 7,
1995, at 7, 10-21 (various articles on Accomplices to Genocide: The Consequences of
Appeasement in Bosnia). America is often blamed for a burden that it never accepted-
the job of policing the world. It might be better to have the United Nations policing the
world in conflicts outside of major-power interests. The Security Council of the United
Nations has the right to intervene, even in purely national conflicts, to prevent breaches
of the peace or acts of aggression that involve massive human rights abuses (e.g., geno-
cide). See U.N. CHARrm arts. 39-5 1. See generally Fernando R. Tes6n, Collective Humani-
tarian Intervention, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 323, 336-42, 369-71 (1996) (discussing Security
Council authorized U.N. military intervention in countries to prevent massive human
rights abuses). There are still conflicts-particularly in Africa-that can potentially kill,
or have killed, tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of human beings. See,
e.g., Andrew Purvis, A Contagion of Genocide: The Civil Wars of Rwanda and Burundi
Spread to Eastern Zafre, in a Bloody Conflict the World Ignores, TIME, July 8, 1996, at 38.
157. For instance, should market economies be allowed to countenance groups of
companies that tend to do business more among themselves than with outsiders? See
Seita, supra note 107, at 217-23 & rm.116-48 (discussing Japanese keiretsu). Should
democratic governments forbid their citizens to exacerbate health and social problems
in other countries? See, e.g., infra notes 167 (exports of tobacco), 174 (child prostitu-
tion). Does the promotion of human rights require the industrialized democracies to
accelerate and widen their efforts to relieve hunger, disease, and suffering abroad? See,
e.g., supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text.
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implement these values. The process of filling out the details of these val-
ues, that is, determining their principles, is facilitated because there is
agreement over basic values. Once a broad framework has been agreed
upon, nations can resolve particular difficulties as necessary.' 58
The most fruitful area of further refinement of values is in the eco-
nomic realm. There is already a process of greater harmonization of rules
and practices that affect trade, investment, and intellectual property.' 5 9
Establishing ground rules for international competition will eliminate the
perceived unfair advantages of some nations. At the same time, there
should be agreement on the proper conduct of governments, businesses,
and individuals in transnational activities. Determining proper behavior
will create a level playing field for international competition and will avoid
actual or perceived disadvantages for some nations.' 60
C. Setting Global Standards and Balancing Values
A major issue raised by globalization is the harmonization of business
practices and the accommodation of competing values. Without common
rules to govern business behavior, companies from one country might com-
pete at a disadvantage against those of another because each country could
have dissimilar rules for acceptable corporate behavior in international
business. Setting up the "rules of the game" in international business is
important not just to promote economic competition under fair conditions
but also to determine the proper balancing of competing values.
158. For example, one value of democracy may be "one person, one vote," giving
equal voting weight to each citizen. This principle is not always recognized by democra-
cies. Some variation from the exact equating of voting weight might be expected
because it may be difficult in practice to make the number of voters eligible to elect a
representative precisely the same. In some cases, federalism concerns might lead to
large differences in voting weight. For example, two senators are elected from each state
in America. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3, ci. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1.
Thus the senators from California, the largest state by population, represent over 60
times the number of people as the senators from Wyoming, the least populated state.
See 1995 STATISICAL ABsTrLcr, supra note 78, at 28-29 tbls. 27-28 (in 1990, at the time
of the most recent census, California and Wyoming had populations of 29.8 million and
454,000, respectively).
159. The European Union is the outstanding example at an international regional
level. See generally KLAus-DmTm BORcHARDT, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THE ORIGINS AND
GROWTH OF THE EuRoPEAN UNION 31-58 (1995). On a global scale, the WTO is poten-
tially of enormous importance in establishing and refining global trade rules. See gener-
ally TRANSMISSION OF LEGISLATION AND RELATED DocumENrs TO IMPLEMENT AGREEMENTS
RESULTING FROM GATT--URUGUAY ROUND-MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316 (1994).
160. See infra notes 161-86 and accompanying text. Some of the details of convergent
values can be determined by dispute settlement bodies that try to flesh out the substan-
tive principles governing disputes. Other details can be written into the substantive
principles themselves. Through either process, the substantive principles become more
defined, and refine the content of convergent values if accepted by the international
community. As much as possible, the industrialized democracies should ensure that
either process successfully works. The dispute settlement body should be fair, compe-
tent, and respected. If written in detailed fashion, the substantive principles should rep-
resent rules of behavior followed internally within the industrialized democracies,
modified to accommodate international conditions.
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As with other policies, the single-minded pursuit of free markets,
democracy, or human rights can be destructive when carried to an
extreme. Any single principle, right, or value has its limits and becomes
constrained before taken too far because it will invariably clash with other
principles, rights, or values.' 61 Like the conflict between liberty and order,
or freedom of the press and a defendant's right to a fair trial, there can be
conflicts among the activities of the free market, a democratic government,
and protection of human rights. While frictions may always be present,
they need to be managed by a balancing of values, to determine how far a
particular value should be pursued, to prevent one value from unduly dom-
inating the others.
In particular, the dynamism of economic globalization has produced a
number of serious, and often novel problems that involve the clashing of
economic objectives with democratic values, human rights, and environ-
mental goals. 162 To be solved effectively, these problems require interna-
tionally agreed upon rules of behavior which accommodate competing
values. For example, an unfettered capitalism can produce a "race to the
bottom" in economic behavior, producing deplorable political and environ-
mental effects. Also, nations might engage in economic activities that have
harmful transnational environmental effects-'externalities" or "spillover
effects."163
The industrialized democracies should therefore have two main, inter-
connected, priorities. First, they should "harmonize" their economic prac-
tices that have a significant international effect. Second, they must
harmonize practices in a way that optimally accommodates other compet-
ing values when conflicts arise. Some judgment about the desirable bal-
ance of competing values is unavoidable. Presumably, it would be
undesirable to have a harmonized rule that all western corporations may
engage in bribery when doing business overseas because that rule would
weaken the integrity of political institutions in foreign, primarily develop-
ing nations.
161. Cf. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (Holmes,
J.) ("All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme. Yet all in fact
are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than those on
which the particular right is founded, and which becomes strong enough to hold their
own when a certain point is reached.").
162. Economic globalization has been blamed for "generating new and fundamental
inequities as regions and nations compete for corporate investment, [and for] lowering
wage, environmental and human rights standards." Incorporating the World, THE
NATION, July 15-22, 1996, at 3.
163. "Externalities" or "spillover effects" are the costs and benefits of market com-
modities not borne by the parties producing or consuming those commodities. Exter-
nalities preclude a competitive market because such a market is supposed to take all
relevant costs and benefits into account. When some such costs and benefits are
excluded from the calculation of market prices, too much or too little of the market
commodity may be produced and sold. See Seita, supra note 50, at 1042 & sources cited
n.175. By analogy, "externalities" in the environmental context are the costs or benefits
of domestic activities that are not suffered or enjoyed by domestic residents.
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Harmonization has already occurred to a degree. Some important
examples of ground rules are found in various GATT and WTO agree-
ments, such as those which prohibit dumped and subsidized goods in
international trade. 164 Another is the agreement reached by the industrial-
ized democracies on capital adequacy requirements for international
banks. 165 There could be global standards on industrial espionage, a
problem that directly afflicts western countries rather than developing
countries,166 and the wisdom of harmful exports such as tobacco
products.167
The area of foreign corrupt practices is another that could be harmo-
nized. There is now no rule that prevents western multinational corpora-
tions from committing corrupt practices overseas. Companies from an
industrialized country with lax laws on foreign corrupt practices can steal
business away from companies headquartered in a country with stringent
laws by offering bribes or engaging in other corrupt practices. Without an
agreement, western firms from different countries would not compete on
equal terms for business contracts in the developing world.
The industrialized democracies are now in the process of reaching an
agreement to prohibit bribes and other corrupt business practices in doing
business abroad. All the industrialized countries currently make it illegal
for companies to engage in corrupt practices at home. 168 The proposed
164. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Agreements on Trade in Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, available in <http://
itl.irv.uit.no/tradejlaw/documents/freetrade> (visited Mar. 29 1997); Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Agreements on Trade in Goods, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, available
in <http://itl.irv.uitno/trade._law/documents/freetrade> (visited Mar. 29 1997).
165. See HERNG & LrrAN, supra note 39, at 107-113. Known as the Basle (or Basel)
Accord, this was an agreement that the U.S. government especially sought because it
believed that American banks were at a competitive disadvantage compared with the
banks of other countries, particularly those of Japan, which had low bank capital
requirements. See generally ScoTT & WELLONS, supra note 39, at 232-92.
166. See, e.g., Paul Blustein, France, Israel Alleged to Spy on U.S. Firms, WASH. PoST,
Aug. 16, 1996, at A28 (The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency identified France, Israel,
China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba as the countries that extensively engaged in "economic
espionage" against the United States; the CIA also stated that, contrary to popular belief,
Japan's efforts to collect economic data "are mostly legal and involve seeking openly
available material or hiring well-placed consultants.").
167. Tobacco exports, cigarette industry advertising, and cigarette industry funding of
academic research are economically significant in a number of countries. See, e.g., 1995
STATISTICAL ABsTcr, supra note 78, at 823 tbl. 1342 (describing how the United States
exported $4.965 billion of cigarettes and $1.303 billion of unmanufactured tobacco in
1994); Kenneth E. Warner et al., Cigarette Advertising and Magazine Coverage of the
Hazards of Smoking-a Statistical Analysis, NEw ENG. J. MED., Jan. 30, 1992, at 305 (find-
ing correlation between cigarette advertising in magazines and reduced magazine cover-
age of the hazards of smoking); Jon Cohen, Institutes Find It Hard to Kick the Tobacco
Funding Habit, SCi., Apr. 26, 1996, at 490. Whether the source of tobacco is imported or
domestic, tobacco consumption is a worldwide problem. See, e.g., Carl E. Bartecchi et
al., The Global Tobacco Epidemic, Sc. AM., May 1995, at 44; Richard Peto et al., Tobacco-
the Growing Epidemic in China, J. AM. MED. ASS'N, June 5, 1996, at 1683.
168. While all member nations of the OECD have criminalized the bribery of, and the
acceptance of bribes by, public officials, few members have laws that make the bribing
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agreement will simply extend that prohibition to activities abroad, and pos-
sibly lead to higher ethical standards in developing countries where cor-
ruption is endemic. This agreement would be enforceable against the
companies most likely to violate the agreement because the great majority
of banks and corporations engaged in international business transactions
come from the industrialized democracies. 169
Setting up the "rules of the game" is important not just to promote
competition under fair conditions. Common ground rules also balance
competing values. In particular, they avoid an injurious race to the bottom
in business practices that elevate economic objectives over all others.
There are business activities that need global standards because the prac-
tices or the secondary effects of economic globalization can directly con-
flict with the protection of human rights.170 For example, there could be
restrictions on investments in countries that violate human rights, 171 stan-
dards on employment conditions by foreign investors in developing
nations, and curbs on the involvement of western tourists in the sex indus-
tries of developing nations. Global standards can balance economic
globalization with the protection of human fights.
Only an international agreement can effectively address the issue of
fair labor conditions in facilities operated or utilized by western corpora-
tions in developing countries. Otherwise, there might be a race to obtain
the lowest possible costs by western corporations, and developing nations
might, for economic gain, condone exploitative activities by foreigners.
These companies could profit from cheap labor in developing countries,
contributing to or preventing improvement in deplorable labor practices,
such as thirteen and fourteen-year-old children working fifteen to twenty-
of foreign officials a criminal offense. See Bribes to Foreign Officials: Tax Deductibility to
End, OECD L-rmn, June 1996, at 3 (Org. Econ. Co-op. & Dev.). Some progress, how-
ever, is being made. For example, the United States has tried to prohibit the use of
bribes by U.S. and other western multinational corporations in less developed nations.
See, e.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977)
(amended 1988); Marlise Simons, U.S. Enlists Rich Nations in Move to End Business
Bribes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1996, at A10. Also, the members of the OECD have agreed
that it is their intention to disallow the tax deductibility of bribes paid to foreign offi-
cials. See id. See generally Gregory L Miles, Crime, Corruption and Multinational Busi-
ness, IN'rL Bus., JuLY 1995, at 34 (discussing the cost of crime and corruption to U.S.
multinational corporations, and estimating minimum annual losses of $260 billion in
U.S. markets and $105 to $135 billion in foreign markets due to bribery and corruption,
business property theft by non-employees, employee theft of property, and intellectual
property theft).
169. If not from the 23 industrialized democracies, such companies are probably
from the other member nations of the OECD (e.g., South Korea, which has large mul-
tinational companies doing business around the world). See generally supra notes 25-26
(discussing the industrialized democracies and member nations of the OECD).
170. See, e.g., KORTEN, supra note 130, at 229-37 (citing problems such as the "hiring
of child labor, cheating workers on overtime pay, imposing merciless quotas, and oper-
ating unsafe facilities," id. at 229).
171. Unilateral attempts at stopping foreign investment in countries like Myanmar
and Cuba might fail. See, e.g., Adam Zagorin, Punishing Cuba's Partners, Tinm, June 24,
1996, at 54 (American allies strongly critical of a U.S. law punishing foreign firms that
use confiscated American assets in Cuba).
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hour workdays under armed guard.172
Obviously, however, foreign investment can provide sorely needed
jobs, for children as well as adults, in developing nations.173 The condi-
tion of child labor is a complex problem involving the shortages of alterna-
tives for children in developing countries. These nations may lack the
educational infrastructure to keep all young teenagers in primary or middle
schools, and national governments may not fully realize that educating
children, rather than making them work, makes more sense for economic
growth in the long run.
There is also the growing problem of child prostitution, mostly in eco-
nomically poorer countries but also in industrialized countries, with
increasing transnational traffic. 174 Teenage children have become trapped
in prostitution, exploited by pimps who extract most of the children's
172. See, e.g., Eyal Press, Kathie Lee's Slip, NATION, June 17, 1996, at 6 (asserting
example of children working 15-hour shifts under armed guard); Stephanik Strom, A
Sweetheart Becomes Suspect: Looking Behind Those Kathie Lee Labels, N.Y. TiMES,June 27,
1996, at D1 (asserting that these same children work 20 hours each day, with no men-
tion of armed guards).
173. At the same time, the desperation of developing countries and their workers
should not allow western companies to use their superior bargaining position to extract
unconscionable concessions. A basic human right should be the right to work for an
"appropriate" wage under "decent" work conditions. Without global standards, there
might be a race to the bottom in providing the lowest wages and the worst working
conditions. See David Holmstrom, One Man's Fight Against Sweatshops, CHlusr. Sci.
MoNnoR, July 3, 1996, at 12. Western investors might give their domestic employees
barely minimal advantages over prevailing miserable foreign wages and employment
conditions. The problem of child labor in developing countries, however, is not purely
one of western creation. The use of child labor is rampant throughout the developing
world. See, e.g., Timothy P. McElduff, Jr. &Jon Veiga, The Child Labor Deterrence Act of
1995: A Choice Between Hegemony and Hypocrisy, 11 ST. JoHN'sJ. LEGAL. COMMENr., 581,
584-88 (1996); Timothy A. Glut, Changing the Approach to Ending Child Labor: An Inter-
national Solution to an International Problem, 28 VAnD. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1203, 1205-10
(1995). See generally PREss REEsEas INDEx (visited Apr. 24, 1997) .http://www.ilo.org/
public/english/235press/pr/index.htm> (containing press releases on the problem of
child labor, from the website of the International Labor Organization, a specialized
agency of the United Nations). If the industrialized nations used their economic power
to force developing nations to prohibit the use of child labor, tens of millions of poor
children would be out of work and possibly forced into even more dangerous occupa-
tions. See Gordon Fairclough, Child Labour: It Isn't Black and White, FAR EAsT. ECON.
REv., Mar. 7, 1996, at 54. Also, western corporations may show more social responsibil-
ity than they are commonly given credit for. Some, perhaps most, western multination-
als apparently carry out policies in developing countries that would meet with approval
in the industrialized countries. See, e.g., Matt Moffett, A Racial "Democracy" Begins Pain-
ful Debate on Affirmative Action: Blacks Make up 45% of Brazil But Stay Marginalized,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 1996, at Al (quoting a Brazilian Justice Ministry official as saying
that "The companies that discriminate the most in Brazil [against blacks] are Brazilian
companies. The best are multinationals, and when multinationals do discriminate it's
usually because the directors are Brazilian.").
174. See, e.g., The Child Sex Trade: Battling a Scourge (Nine-Part Series), CHIST. Sci.
MoNroR, Aug. 22-Sept. 16, 1996, at 1; Nicholas D. Kristof, Asian Childhoods Sacrificed
to Prosperity's Lust, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1996, § 1 at 1 (reporting on tens of thousands of
children who are working as enslaved prostitutes in Cambodia, India, China, Thailand,
the Philippines, Taiwan, and other countries); Margaret A. Healy, Prosecuting Child Sex
Tourists at Home: Do Laws in Sweden, Australia, and the United States Safeguard the Rights
of Children as Mandated by International Law?, 18 Foauit'i INT'L I.J. 1852 (1995).
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"earnings" and use the children as virtual slaves. While the growth of child
prostitution in developing countries has been fueled to a certain extent by
sex tourists from the industrialized world, most exploiters of children are
domestic ones.175 "Employment" for children and local community stan-
dards of morality should never justify the use of child prostitutes to satisfy
local and western lust. The trade in child sex is just part of the general
problem of prostitution present in every country but especially widespread
in the developing world.
The sex "market" in the poorer countries attracts male "buyers" from
the industrialized countries-Europeans, Americans, Japanese, Australians,
Canadians, New Zealanders, and others-who are able to pay higher prices
than local customers and thereby increase the supply of prostitutes.176 Yet,
like child prostitution, adult prostitution in developing nations is not a
problem caused by the industrialized countries; domestic patrons outnum-
ber foreign ones. 177 Poverty, the lack of economic and educational oppor-
tunities for children and women, cultures that tolerate prostitution, and
affluent western sex tourists combine to create thriving sex industries in
many developing countries.178
Another important conflict is with the principle of environmental pro-
tection, a value that is generally more strongly held among the industrial-
ized than the developing countries.' 79 There is often a clash between the
policies of protecting the environment and encouraging economic develop-
ment. Domestic activities would not be an international problem if their
effects were substantially confined within national boundaries. But local
activities can have detrimental spillover effects-harmful externalities that
have transnational or global effects: radioactive fallout (from nuclear
power plant accidents), acid rain, ozone depletion, global warming, and
depletion of tropical rain forests.' 80 Other local economic activities, while
not directly affecting the welfare of foreigners, can cause environmental
concern: the decimation of wild fish stocks in the world's oceans by mod-
em industrial fishing, 18 1 the destruction of coastal areas by economic
activities, 182 and the trade in endangered species.' 83
175. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 174.
176. See, e.g., id.; CLEo ODZMR, PATPONG SIsTERs: AN AMEmcAN WoMAN's VIEW OF THE
BANGKOK SEx WORLD v, 1-22 (1994).
177. See, e.g., ODzE, supra note 176 (describing the Thai sex industry).
178. See, e.g., sources cites supra note 174.
179. See, e.g., DANIEL C. Esr, GREENING um GATT: TRAmE, ENVIRoNMENT, AND THE
FutruPE 24-27, 181-203, 238-39 (1994).
180. See Rlc A D N. COOPER, ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE PoucMIs FOR THE WORLD
ECONOMY xx-xxi, 37-68 (1994).
181. See Carl Safina, The World's Imperiled Fish, Sci. Am., Nov. 1995, at 46. Countries
may simply ignore conservation agreements that they sign, or they may even disregard
the United Nations. See id. at 50-52. "In 1990 high-seas drift nets tangled 42 million
animals that were not targeted, including diving seabirds and marine mammals. Such
massive losses prompted the U.N. to enact a global ban on large-scale drift nets (those
longer than 2.5 kilometers)-although countries like Italy, France and Ireland, continue
to deploy ther." Id. at 51.
182. See Don Hinrichsen, Coasts in Crisis, Iss. Sci. & TECH., Summer 1996, at 39.
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Thus, there should be a balance between the right of nations to utilize
their resources and engage in economic activity, and the right of other
nations to be free from harmful externalities. Whether this conflict is char-
acterized as one between protection of the environment and free market
principles (or democracy or human rights), there is a clash between the
value of protecting the environment and a convergent value.' 84 Views
regarding environmental protection may eventually converge if global stan-
dards are agreed upon.185 Major steps towards possible future conver-
gence have emerged from the Rio Conference, with its aspirational but
nonbinding Agenda 21 and Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment, which address, among other issues, the problem of "sustainable
development."18 6 In time, the protection of the environment may become
183. See, e.g., Donald G. McNeil Jr., Madagascar Reptile Theft Hits Rarest of Tortoises:
Stolen Animals Are Thought to Have Been Taken for the World's Illicit Pet Trade, N.Y. TIME,
July 2, 1996, at Cl.
184. While some commentators have argued that protection of the environment is
part of a new generation of human rights, that view has not yet gained widespread
acceptance. See INTERNATIONAL ENIRoNmENTAL LAw ANTHOLOGY 34-37, 61-69 (Anthony
D'Amato & Kirsten Engel eds., 1996); VED P. NANDA, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw & Poucy 61-72 (1995). Since any important right could conceivably be viewed as
a "human" right, this Article takes the common position that human rights are distinct
from environmental protection. The basic international human rights treaties contain
provisions that recognize the "inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and
freely their natural wealth and resources" and the right of "[a]ll peoples ... for their own
ends, [to] freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources." International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 32, arts. 1 para. 2, 25; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 32, arts. 1 para. 2, 47.
185. See John H. Cushman Jr., In Shift, U.S. Will Seek Binding World Pact to Combat
Global Warming, N.Y. TmAEs, July 17, 1996, at A6 (reporting that "[flor the first time, the
United States will seek a binding international agreement to reduce the kinds of air
pollution, chiefly from burning fossil fuels, that threaten to warm the global climate").
186. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)
was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from June 3-14 of 1992. Popularly referred to as the
Rio Conference or the Earth Summit, the UNCED was the most widely attended environ-
mental conference in history, with over a hundred heads of state and representatives
from over 170 nations. See NA~NA, supra note 184, at 103. At the Rio Conference, all
nations in attendance (including the United States) unanimously adopted three non-
binding instruments. See Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (1992); AGENDA 21: THE EARTH
Suinarr STRATEGY TO SAVE OUR PLANEr 1, 24-26 (Daniel Sitarz ed., 1994). See generally
THE ENVrmoN MENr AFTER Rio (Luigi Campiglio et al. eds., 1994).
The first instrument, the Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development, deals
with the issues of sustainable economic development and achieving an equitable bal-
ance between the sometimes conflicting developmental and environmental needs of cur-
rent and future generations and of different nations. See Rio Declaration on the
Environment and Development, U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, 47th
Sess., Annex 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26, vol. 1, at 8 (1992), available in 31 I.L.M.
874. The massive text of Agenda 21, the second instrument, is contained in three U.N.
volumes. See Agenda 21, U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, 47th Sess.,
Annex 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26, vol. 1, at 14 et seq. [hereinafter Agenda 21].
Agenda 21 addresses numerous environmental issues, with the following major themes:
the quality of life on earth, the efficient use of the earth's natural resources, the protec-
tion of the earth's global commons (the atmosphere and oceans), the management of
human settlements, chemicals and waste, and sustainable economic growth. See AGENDA
21: THE EARTH SUMMrr STRATEGY TO SAVE OUR PLANTr, supra, at 8-19. See generally
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another converging value.
Conclusion
Globalization has been primarily an economic process that has expanded
markets for international trade and opportunities for international invest-
ment. Simultaneously, it has increased economic interdependency among
nations and made nations economically vital to each other. But globaliza-
tion is more than just doing business with foreigners and traveling to for-
eign lands. Through sophisticated technology and international news
reporting, globalization connects persons throughout the world and brings
into local homes vast amounts of information about transnational issues.
It has placed a human face on people in distant lands, and cultivated a
global perspective and a sensitivity to different foreign traditions. More
people learn about foreign cultures, become interested in foreign affairs,
and speak foreign languages. Travelers or alien residents in foreign lands
often expect to receive the same basic rights as they do at home.
Profoundly, globalization has contributed to the convergence of basic
values among nations towards the liberal democratic values of market
economies, democratic governments, and human rights. The clear tri-
umph of market economies over command economies as well as the liberal-
ization of international trade and investment has converted numerous
nations over to general free market principles. For people in different
countries, globalization has contributed to an expanding consciousness
that prefers democratic governments and human rights over authoritarian
regimes that repress freedoms.
As values converge, nationals of one country often care enough to
work for the enjoyment of similar political rights in other countries. Ulti-
mately, globalization is important and desirable because it encourages a
belief in the primacy of the human race. A world in which liberal demo-
cratic values abound and people emphasize their status as human beings
will be more humane than the world of the past. We should dream of a
common humanity for "[w]e are such stuff [a]s dreams are made on."18 7
Agenda 21, supra; AGENDA 21 & mE UNCED PROCEEDINGS, vols. 1-6 (Nicholas A. Robin-
son ed., 1992 & 1993). The third instrument covers the treatment of forests. See Non-
Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Man-
agement, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, U.N. Confer-
ence on Environment and Development, 47th Sess., Annex 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/
26, vol. 3 at 111 (1992), available in 31 LL.M. 881.
The issue of sustainable development is one that has captured the attention of many
commentators. See, e.g., SusrAnwsLE Dma~voPmrNr AND INTERNATiONAL LAw (Winfried
Land ed., 1995); A SURvEY oF ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS (Rajaram Krishnan et al. eds.,
1995); GREENING INTERNATIONAL Lw (Philippe Sands ed., 1994); INvESTNG IN NATURAL
CAPIrrAL: THE ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS APPROACH TO SusrAiNABILuTy (AnnMari Jansson et
al. eds., 1994); ToWARD SUSTAIaABL DavaoPENmr. CONcErs, MEmHODS, AND Poucy
(Jeroen C. van den Bergh & Jan van der Straaten eds., 1994).
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